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THE COST OF AVOIDANCE:
PLURALISM, NEUTRALITY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
MELISSA MORTAZAVI*
ABSTRACT
This Article offers an answer to key questions in modern American legal ethics: when
and why did the legal profession stop talking about professional conduct in moral terms?
Mining the history of current rules governing lawyer conduct, this Article reveals that while
the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility sought to revolutionize legal ethics by
creating a professional code that was more transparent, democratized, and less hierarchical
than the preceding 1908 Canons of Legal Ethics, that effort also excised a moral understanding of lawyering in order to facilitate a particular understanding of pluralism.
The drafters of the 1969 Model Code faced a difficult task. They recognized women and
minorities were entering the legal profession in unprecedented numbers. Aware of impending conflicts within the newly diverse bar and unsure how to resolve them, drafters of the
Model Code struck a devil’s bargain: in exchange for the peaceable coexistence of heterogeneous parties, the Model Code sought to remove moral disputes from the workplace by embracing neutral partisanship. This Article discusses the consequences of that choice. It argues
that in order to permit one form of pluralism (demographic pluralism) the bar adopted a
professional conduct system (neutral partisanship) that now impedes the inclusion of full
substantive pluralism (including value pluralism).
Neutrality is not neutral. Avoidance has its costs. The Model Code did not actually remove morality from practice: it only prevented new lawyers from having the language and
means to challenge and change existing moral norms in the profession. Modern legal ethics’
endorsement of neutral partisanship structurally impedes substantive discussions amongst
students, lawyers, judges, and academics about proper ends and appropriate means. This
Article is a call to reopen discussion as it reveals why the legal profession embraced this
particular model of lawyering in the first place and how that purpose has been frustrated
over time.
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I. INTRODUCTION
By the 1960s, the American Bar Association (ABA) could not remain impervious to the general social upheaval of the civil rights
revolution.1 The legal profession was in flux2 and faced changes in its
overall size and composition as a wave of new entrants from formerly
excluded groups gained broader access to higher education and political capital.3 Lawyers and legal regulators faced novel and vexing
questions: How could the bar devise ethical standards to include these newcomers, appeal to current members, and distance itself from
1. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1278-81, 1295 (1986) (dubbing the late 1960s and the early 1970s the ―Public
Interest Era‖). The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment abolishing
poll taxes, the Voting Rights Act, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 were all newly minted.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1–2000h-6
(2012); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2012); Civil Rights Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90–284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 25,
and 42 U.S.C.).
2. See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal
Ethics—II The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 216 (2002) (―[T]he American
legal profession is subject to the wheels of political and social fortune just like many other
occupational groups.‖).
3. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 284 (1989) (showing varying estimates of percentage of women law students in 1970, ranging from 2.8% to 5.1%); A.B.A.,
FIRST YEAR AND TOTAL J.D. ENROLLMENT BY GENDER, 1947-2011, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissi
ons_to_the_bar/statistics/jd_enrollment_1yr_total_gender.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited
Feb. 12, 2015) (noting that in 1960, women accounted for 3.4% of total J.D. enrollment, and
by the late 1970s, that number rose significantly to 30.8%, which marks an 806% increase
in the percentage of women enrolled in J.D. programs over a period of less than twenty
years); SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A.B.A., LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 13-27 (1992) [hereinafter
ABA, LEGAL EDUCATION] (describing a rapid diversification of the bar throughout the
1960s in terms of race and gender); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 222 (―Prior to the 1970s,
various aspects of the legal profession had seen little change, including (1) the profession‘s
size, (2) its percentages of men (very large) and women (minute) lawyers, (3) its racial composition (predominantly white), (4) the size of law firms, (5) the number of law schools and
the size of the law student population, (6) the incomes of lawyers relative to other occupational groups, and (7) the constrained conditions for competition within the legal profession.‖); see also Jonathan D. Glater, Women Are Close to Being Majority of Law Students,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2001, at A1 (reporting new ABA figures showing 49.4% women
among 2000-01 law students, with more women than men applying for 2001-02).
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its exclusionary past?4 What moral views regarding the role of lawyers and hot-button topics like civil disobedience would female or minority attorneys hold?5 And if they did have different views than the
existing bar, ―whose conscience and whose ethical standards [we]re to
control?‖6
The 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code)
was the bar‘s answer to these questions.7 In it, the bar laid out professional principles to govern lawyers in an ―urbanized society‖8 and
break with the dated and elitist 1908 Canons of Ethics.9 This was no
easy task. The mechanics of a new, more inclusive system of professional conduct were not obvious. Faced with moral and demographic
pluralism at the bar and unwilling or unable to negotiate it, the
drafters of the Model Code struck a devil‘s bargain; in exchange for
4. Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics—I. Origins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469, 485 (2001) (―[T]he ABA until well into the
twentieth century functioned mainly as an exclusive social fraternal organization of highstatus lawyers rather than as a broadly representative and unofficial regulatory body.‖).
5. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. Much of the established bar viewed
civil disobedience skeptically, while newer entrants may have supported opposition of unjust laws through civil disobedience. In the view of the existing bar, lawyers had no role in
fomenting disobedience of established laws, even if these laws were oppressive, for lawyers
instead ought to work through established legal channels to effectuate change. See, for
example, 111 CONG. REC. 15103 (1965), in which one of the leading legal ethics reformers—
in an address originally given to the Tennessee Bar Association on June 17, 1965, introduced into the record by Strom Thurmond—warned of civil disobedience‘s ability to ―seriously threaten the breakdown of law, order, and morality‖ and called for ―impartial, evenhanded, vigorous, swift and certain enforcement of our criminal laws, and the real and
substantial punishment thereunder of all conduct that violates those laws.‖ See also id.
(arguing that ―[n]o ‗end‘ . . . however worthy [can ever] justify resort to unlawful means‖
and that ―America needs a genuine revival of respect for law and orderly process . . . a new
impatience with those who violate and circumvent the laws, and a determined insistence
that laws be enforced‖ (alterations in original)).
6. John F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255, 260 (1970) (official reporter for the Model Code
explaining the reasons that supported the Code‘s development).
7. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1259
(1991) (―[R]adical changes occurring in the profession weakened the traditional bar‘s conception of itself, which in turn enhanced the bar‘s difficulties in dealing with the fact that
its norms were becoming public law.‖); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 210 (―[S]tresses within
our society . . . affected American law and the American legal profession. These stresses
created a fertile ground for legal change to occur and appear to have combined as its triggering force.‖). See generally Chris G. McDonough & Michael L. Epstein, Regulating Attorney Conduct: Specific Statutory Schemes v. General Regulatory Guidelines, 11 TOURO L.
REV. 609, 610-11 (1995); Fred C. Zacharias, Foreword: The Quest for a Perfect Code, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 787 (1998).
8. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980); see also Edward L.
Wright, Study of the Canons of Professional Ethics, 11 CATH. LAW 323, 323 (1965) (―[T]he
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association need revision [because] . . . changing conditions in an urbanized society require new statements of professional responsibility.‖).
9. See infra notes 23-28.
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the peaceable coexistence of heterogeneous parties, they excised discussions of morality from the workplace.
This Article discusses the consequences of that choice. It argues
that in order to facilitate one form of pluralism (demographic pluralism) the bar adopted a professional conduct system (neutral partisanship) that now impedes the inclusion of full substantive pluralism
(including value pluralism). It did so by creating a set of national disciplinary rules that removed discussions of morality from professional discourse.10 Those rules incorporated, strengthened, and operationalized previous loose commitments to a client-centric model of
lawyering now known as ―neutral partisanship.‖11 Just as colorblindness became the new hegemonic paradigm elsewhere, the legal
profession adopted its own sanitized regime for regulating a diverse
bar and avoiding conflict through the neutral-partisan model.
However, neutrality is not neutral. Avoidance has its costs. Modern legal ethics‘ endorsement of neutral partisanship structurally
impedes meaningful discussions amongst students, lawyers, judges,
and academics about proper ends and appropriate means. The Model
Code did not succeed in removing morality from standards of practice; it only prevented new lawyers from developing the language and
means to challenge and modify existing moral norms in place. The
Model Code set a certain moral vision of legal professionalism: lawyers were not expected to be any more than legal technicians, fulfilling clients‘ ends. Certain skills were prioritized, others cast aside.
A lawyer‘s moral contemplation, empowerment, or even responsibility was rendered officially optional. As a result, today‘s legal profes10. See, e.g., Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History
and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1, 10 (1970) (chairman of the drafting committee noting
that ―[t]he division [between issues concerning morals versus issues requiring disciplinary
action] is one that has not previously been generally made‖ in legal ethics and that ―[o]ne of
the weaknesses of the Canons of Professional Ethics was its failure to speak to the two
forces separately‖); Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So.2d 1242, 1244 n.4 (Miss. 1991) (―Our rules
regulating professional conduct have evolved from canons to ethical considerations and
now to a code quite like unto a criminal code.‖).
11. Neutral partisanship is the idea that lawyers are not accountable for the morality
of their client‘s chosen ends (hence neutrality) and yet act as a partisan in favor of their
client‘s interests (by providing representation that argues on their client‘s behalf). This
concept has many attendant names including ―amoral lawyering‖ or ―role morality‖ and
―role differentiation,‖ since the role of being a lawyer is viewed as morally distinct from
actions taken on from the ―role‖ of being a private citizen. See Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 613 (using the term amoral lawyering model due to the distance of the lawyer‘s moral accountability for client outcomes); Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in
Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1378 (defining
role morality as ―the idea, much maligned by legal ethicists, that lawyers should receive
some degree of immunity from the general requirements of conscience on account of their
distinctive social role‖).

2014]

THE COST OF AVOIDANCE

155

sion suffers from a self-imposed inability to talk about morality or
fundamental differences in the workplace.
Equally troubling, this neutral-partisan ideal renders all lawyers
interchangeable widgets, as the bulk of what makes lawyers individuals is deemed professionally irrelevant, worthless, and even inappropriate. Neutral partisanship is the dominant moral fiction where
all people are expected to behave the same way, and that singular
way of acting is deemed ―neutral‖—although, in reality, it is not.
This Article tells the story of how and why neutral partisanship
became the dominant norm for modern lawyering and argues that
while such ―neutrality‖ may have at one time served the purpose
supporting pluralism at the bar, today it has outlived its utility. Part
II begins by laying out how the bar came to pursue demographic pluralism in drafting the Model Code and why the adoption of neutral
partisanship became a vital part of that process. Part III discusses
how the Model Code set up a system that solidified a commitment to
neutral partisanship by divorcing morality from mandatory rules
governing professional conduct. Finally, Part IV explains how neutral
partisanship actually impedes a full understanding of pluralism
which includes value pluralism. It does so by critiquing 1) the argument that neutral partisanship placed the power in the hands of the
clients (the people) over ―elitist‖ lawyers and 2) the idea that neutral
partisanship itself is (or can be) value neutral.
I conclude that the Model Code has failed to serve the very values
that it sought to facilitate: broad conceptions of pluralism.12 As such,
the ongoing disenfranchisement of discussions of morality in modern
professional discourse cannot be justified on those terms. However,
by recognizing the historically contingent normative commitments
embedded in modern legal ethics, the bar and the academy can work
towards revitalizing legal ethics so that it becomes a tool for the
modern bar, not a hindrance to it.

12. Current norms, rules, and regulations governing lawyers today exist because of
the shift in legal ethics from a treatise-style discussion of professionalism to a statute-like
structure that polices the conduct of lawyers—a shift that occurred with the advent of the
Model Code. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’
Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1582 (1994) (―Unlike the Canons, the Model Code provided specific and legally binding normative rules, thus ‗legalizing‘ substantive professional
regulation.‖); Hazard, supra note 7, at 1251 (―In retrospect, it is clear that the crucial step
in the ‗legalization‘ process occurred in the change from the 1908 Canons to the 1970 Code,
rather than from the Code to the 1983 Rules. It was the Code that first embraced legally
binding norms in the form of the Disciplinary Rules . . . .‖).
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II. THE CANONS OF ETHICS AND THE MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. In the Beginning, the ABA Created the Canons
In the United States, the history of attempts to formalize legal
ethics into a national document is concise.13 In part in response to the
American Medical Association‘s adoption of a professional code of
ethics, as well as concern over excessive ―commercialism‖ in law
practice,14 the ABA15 created an advisory ethics committee in 1905.16
The Committee‘s work culminated in a draft ethics proposal entitled
the ―Canons of Professional Ethics‖ (Canons).17 George Sharswood‘s
1854 essay, ―An Essay on Professional Ethics,‖ was of particular importance as it was reprinted and circulated to all ABA members with
the draft Canons.18 The ABA membership ultimately adopted these
Canons officially in 1908.19
The Canons were brief, containing only thirty-two guidelines, and
were written in broad terms. They read more like a treatise or essay

13. This is not to say, however, that no rules governed lawyer behavior prior to this
time. Rather, the common law, in connection with norms of practice and homogeneity in
the group of people trained in law, provided guidance on improper conduct.
14. Commercialism was code for opposition to the emergence of working class lawyers
who served immigrants, the urban poor, and blue-collar workers. JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 41-43 (1976).
15. At the turn of the century membership in the ABA was by invitation only and
limited to a small but highly influential percentage of the overall lawyer population. See
JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND
RESPONSES TO CHANGE 10 (2013).
16. Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the
1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 7-8 (1999) (―[L]aw journals at the turn of the century were replete with articles lamenting growing ‗commercialism‘ in law practice . . . .‖).
17. David R. Papke, The Legal Profession and Its Ethical Responsibilities: A History,
in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 29, 37 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston eds.,
1986). The Canons borrowed doctrinally from the ethics rules of Alabama, as well as the
works of George Sharswood and David Hoffman upon which the Alabama Code of Ethics
was based. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 11 (7th ed. 2000) (discussing how Professor Sharswood‘s work
was influenced by David Hoffman‘s 1836 publication Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Development); Carle, supra note 16, at 9 (relaying how the drafters of the Canons
consulted Hoffman and Sharswood in addition to existing state codes, particularly that of
Alabama); Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 507 (1998) (discussing the role the Alabama Code served as a model for the original Canons).
18. Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 33 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
567, 568 (1908) [hereinafter Final Report]; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF LAWYERING 14-15 (4th ed. 2005); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering
the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 243 (1992).
19. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 617 (2008).
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than a rulebook.20 The Canons‘ lofty tone was often distinctly moral
in nature, concluding that a lawyer finds his ―highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as
an honest man and a patriotic citizen,‖ not exclusively in the service
of a client.21
The level of generality of the Canons‘ wording did not prevent it
from becoming canonical quickly, in the sense of being widely adopted and influential.22 Although the ABA had (and has) no authority
over the various state bars, over time the Canons were formally or
informally adopted in most states through either direct bar or court
action.23 Over the next sixty years, the ABA added only fifteen provisions to the Canons.24 Thus, the original 1908 Canons remained
largely intact and central to governing legal practice in the United
States well into the early 1970s.25
Critiques of the Canons were strong and mounting by the 1960s.26
In 1958, the ABA Joint Conference had submitted an ethics report
penned in large part by Lon Fuller, a celebrated ethics scholar, flagging the need to revisit the Canons. He noted that ―[t]oday the lawyer
plays a changing and increasingly varied role. In many developing
fields the precise contribution of the legal profession is as yet undefined.‖27 For some, concerns focused on the lack of specificity and en-

20. See generally Final Report, supra note 18, at 575-85.
21. Id. at 584.
22. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23-26 (1953); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1, cmt. b (2000) (noting how states differed in treating the
Canons as mandatory rules or nonbinding guidance for proper conduct); Papke, supra note
17, at 39 (noting how three-fourths of all states had adopted the Canons by the beginning
of World War I).
23. But note, bar adoption is not necessarily coterminous with a consensus of support
from practicing lawyers. Some scholars have noted that participation in bar associations is
partially the purview of economic privilege, as time spent on bar associations necessarily
cuts into time spent on billable or paying matters. See Papke, supra note 17, at 36 (―Country lawyers could rise to prominence in the bar associations of rural states, but in general
urban lawyers, with the resources and types of practices that could facilitate conventioneering and organized bar work, were the leaders of the bar associations.‖).
24. Canons 33-45 were adopted at the ABA‘s annual meeting in 1928. See Proceedings, 51 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 29, 130 (1928). Canon 46, regarding advertisement of specialized
legal services, was adopted at the ABA‘s annual meeting in 1933. See Proceedings, 56 ANN.
REP. A.B.A. 41, 178, 429 (1933). Canon 47, regarding conduct that aids the unauthorized
practice of law, was adopted on September 30, 1937. See Supplemental Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 62 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 761, 767 (1937).
25. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW & ETHICS 11
(9th ed. 2012).
26. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958) (seminal report calling for reform of the
Canon-based system).
27. Id. at 1159.
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forceability in the Canons.28 In keeping with the distributive justice
sentiments of the time, others critiqued the profession‘s failure to
serve underrepresented groups of the American population.29 Some
highlighted the darker undertones of the Canons‘ naissance, arguing
that it functioned as a gatekeeper to keep ethnic minorities and
women from gaining upward mobility as lawyers and serving low income and immigrant communities.30 The Canons were also susceptible to critique as maintaining the landed gentry‘s exclusivity of the
bar.31 With general, ambiguous language and limitations on advertising, fees, and client development, the Canons were a natural poster
child for the established bar‘s elitism and distance from less wellconnected lawyers and clients.32
These internal and external concerns finally came to a head in
1964. That year, the ABA president, and future Justice, Lewis F.
Powell Jr., convened a ―Special Committee on the Evaluation of Ethical Standards‖ (known as the ―Wright Committee‖) to propose
amendments to the existing Canons.33 Originally, the Wright Committee convened with the purpose of recommending revisions to the

28. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980) (listing among the
shortcomings to the Canons that ―most of the Canons did not lend themselves to practical
sanction for violations‖); 58 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 94-95 (1935) (arguing that the Canons offer
little concrete guidance and suggesting ―a Code of Practice which will deal not with general
principles but with the specific abuses involved‖); John F. Sutton, Jr., Guidelines to Professional Responsibility, 39 TEX. L. REV. 391, 422-23 (1961) (arguing that the Canons are insufficiently specific to set a reasonable minimum standard); Wright, supra note 10, at 4
(quoting a 1958 American Bar Foundation report stating that the Canons do not present
―sufficient detail‖ in dealing with ―specific situations encountered in actual practice‖).
29. See Papke, supra note 17, at 38, 41. See generally Wolfram supra note 4, at 485
(―[T]he ABA until well into the twentieth century functioned mainly as an exclusive social
fraternal organization of high-status lawyers rather than as a broadly representative and
unofficial regulatory body.‖).
30. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 14, at 43-130; RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM 157 (1955).
31. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 1250 (―The Canons . . . expressed the viewpoint of an
economically advantaged social stratum distinguished by its intellectual accomplishment,
attachment to the business community, and preoccupation with civic political affairs.‖);
Papke, supra note 17, at 38 (discussing disproportionate effects of the Canons, particularly
limitations of expertise claims and advertising, on solo practitioners who serviced working
class people). See generally Harry Cohen, Ambivalence Affecting Modern American Law
Practice, 18 ALA. L. REV. 31, 31 (1965) (―Many rules and principles which purport to guide
professional conduct today are based on the premise that the American lawyer is in the
same economic and professional environment as his predecessors who practiced in the nineteenth century or as barristers in the English system.‖); Donald T. Weckstein, A Re-Evaluation
of the Canons of Professional Ethics—Evaluated, 33 TENN. L. REV. 176, 180 (1966).
32. See Carle, supra note 16, at 16 (noting that all fourteen final committee members
were members of the ―social and economic elite of the profession‖ and were exclusively
white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant).
33. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 19, at 617-18; HAZARD ET AL., supra note 18, at 14.
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existing Canons.34 However, attempts to reword the Canons ―became
an extended search for the full meaning of professional responsibility
in the context of modern day society, a search that culminated in the
formulation of the [Model] Code.‖35 As such, the Committee began a
multi-year journey of deliberations that eventually resulted in the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
B. From Canons to Code: Operationalizing Theory
Wright Committee members were mindful of the political climate
and contemporary changes facing the legal profession.36 As the preface to the Model Code makes explicit, the Model Code was drafted in
direct response to contemporary practice.37 It noted that the ―changed
and changing conditions in our legal system and urbanized society
require new statements of professional principles.‖38 New demographics of people were joining or about to join the profession in
force.39 The ―[r]ecruitment into the profession was affected by programs reaching out to racial minorities and women, whose assimilation into law practice became both a norm of public policy and a legal
duty.‖40 The profession was also growing quickly in size, partially in
response to the expansion of the administrative state.41 The Committee was aware of the urgency behind the need to adapt. It emphasized this in the Code:
34. See Wright, supra note 10, at 5 (―A completely changed document was not
envisioned.‖).
35. Id. at 6.
36. The chair of the Committee, Edward L. Wright, stated that the Model Code was a
―substantial improvement‖ over the Canons precisely because ―it is the result of a thorough
review of the functions of lawyers in modern-day society.‖ Id. at 17.
37. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Pmbl. n.5 (1980) (― ‗The law and its institutions change as social conditions change. They must change if they are to preserve, much
less advance, the political and social values from which they derive their purpose and their
life. This is true of the most important of legal institutions, the profession of law. The profession, too, must change when conditions change in order to preserve and advance the
social values that are its reasons for being.‘ ‖ (quoting Elliott E. Cheatham, Availability of
Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer and the Organized Bar, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 438, 440 (1965))).
38. Id. at Preface.
39. See, e.g., ABA, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 3 (describing a rapid diversification
of the bar throughout the 1960s in terms of race and gender); ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS,
MILES TO GO: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A.B.A. COMM. ON
RACIAL & ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2004). Cf. Beverly Balos, Conferring on the MacCrate Report: A Clinical Gaze, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 349, 361 (1994) (noting
that the MacCrate report overlooked disabled and homosexual lawyers).
40. Hazard, supra note 7, at 1259.
41. See BARBARA A. CURRAN, WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS 8-9 (1995)
(noting that because of a steep increase in total numbers of law students, increased percentages of women law students did not displace male students in the total number of law
jobs available to them); Hazard, supra note 7, at 1259 n.109.
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The advances in natural science and technology are so startling
and the velocity of change in business and in social life is so great
that the law along with the other social sciences, and even human
life itself, is in grave danger of being extinguished by new gods of
its own invention if it does not awake from its lethargy.42

The extent to which societal shifts were on the minds of the drafters of the Code is evident in the Model Code‘s multiple references to
evaluating lawyer‘s roles in response to historical context and fluid
circumstances.43 The preamble of the Model Code also reminded lawyers that ―a lawyer must with courage and foresight be able and
ready to shape the body of the law to the ever-changing relationships
of society.‖ 44 Acknowledging the momentous changes in society, the
Code identifies the difficulties this places on the bar itself:
Changing times produce changes in our laws and legal
procedures. . . .
We have undergone enormous changes in the last fifty years
within the lives of most of the adults living today who may be
seeking advice. Most of these changes have been accompanied by
changes and developments in the law . . . . Every practicing lawyer
encounters these problems and is often perplexed with his own inability to keep up, not only with changes in the law, but also with
changes in the lives of his clients and their legal problems.45

Thus, mindful of the need to transform and the social pressures at
play in an ―urbanized society,‖46 the Wright Committee embarked on
drafting a Model Code that met these needs, yet was ―designed to be
acceptable to the profession‖ as it currently stood.47 The Wright
Committee itself was hardly an anti-establishment group.48 Although
the Committee chair, Edward L. Wright, noted that the twelve members of the Committee represented ―a broad spectrum of the profes42. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1 n.1 (1980).
43. See, e.g., id. at EC 2-7 (―Changed conditions, however, have seriously restricted
the effectiveness of the traditional [attorney] selection process.‖); id. at EC 2-10 (―Because
technological change is a recurrent feature of communications forms, and because perceptions of what is relevant in lawyer selection may change, lawyer advertising regulations
should not be cast in rigid, unchangeable terms.‖); id. at EC 8-1 (―Changes in human affairs and imperfections in human institutions make necessary constant efforts to maintain
and improve our legal system.‖).
44. See id. at Pmbl.
45. Id. at EC 6-1 n.1 (internal quotations omitted).
46. Id. at Preface.
47. Hazard, supra note 7, at 1252.
48. See Wright, supra note 10, at 2 nn.1-3 (listing Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., John
Ritchie, A. James Casner, Slyvester C. Smith, Glenn M. Coulter, John G. Weinmann, E.
Smythe Gambrell, Sherman Welpton, Jr., Benton E. Gates, Charles E. Whittaker, William
H. Morrison, and Edward L. Wright).
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sion,‖ others might categorize it as a fairly narrow slice of society reflecting the traditional demographics of the profession.49 The Committee included the Associate Dean of Harvard Law School,50 the
Dean of Northwestern Law School,51 one former Supreme Court Justice,52 and nine current practitioners in private practice (including
two former ABA presidents).53 Wright himself was a lawyer from private practice in Arkansas where he was a longtime active member of
the ABA, a leader of the American College of Trial Attorneys, and a
prospective future president of the ABA.54 He was known for being
―outwardly conventional—indeed formal—in dress, conversation, and
deportment.‖55 The Committee did not include women or members of
minority racial or ethnic groups. The Wright Committee‘s membership is notable as the process of drafting the rules was private; the
Committee deliberated in closed meetings, no interim drafts were
published or circulated, and no hearings were held.56 During the final
years of the process, a young female attorney acted as an assistant
reporter to the Committee, but there is no indication that she was
consulted for substantive input.57
The Wright Committee faced unique challenges. Unlike the drafters of the Canons in 1908 who were drafting rules for a comparatively homogenous membership, the Wright Committee was crafting
rules for an increasingly diverse group of lawyers. The drafters likely
did not share many personal connections or common experiences
with these new entrants.58 Recognizing that there would be multiple
views of what is moral conduct in the emerging bar, ―the issue quickly becomes, whose conscience and whose ethical standards are to con-

49. Id. at 2.
50. Id. at 2 n.3.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2 n.1.
53. Id. at 2 n.4. Notably, Gambrell founded the Legal Aid Society of Atlanta. Genesee
County Bar Program Wins ABA Professionalism Award, 79 MICH. B.J. 1159, 1180 (2000).
54. See Wright, supra note 10, at 2.
55. Hazard, supra note 7, at 1252.
56. See id. at 1253.
57. John F. Sutton, a University of Texas law professor and former chairman of the
Texas State Ethics Committee, acted as the official reporter. For the last two years of the
process, Sutton was assisted by a recent University of Texas School of Law graduate, a
young woman who came to take a very active role in the civil right struggle as the lead
counsel in Roe v. Wade, Ms. Sarah Weddington. See Wright, supra note 10, at 2-3. Weddington also actively aided chairman Wright in publications related to the Code. Id.
58. As such, the disciplinary rules ―functioned as a statute defining the legal contours
of a vocation whose practitioners were connected primarily by having been licensed to practice law.‖ Hazard, supra note 7, at 1251.
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trol?‖59 Unable or unwilling to engage this question, the Wright
Committee devised an alternative to direct confrontation: it created a
system to ignore such differences and attempt to insulate the workplace from value pluralism. Specifically, the drafters of the Model
Code (1) separated ethical considerations from a ―floor‖ of acceptable
conduct (known as disciplinary rules), thereby removing any mandatory discussion of morality (as opposed to legality) from general discourse or debate on the bar level, and (2) strengthened and operationalized a commitment to neutral partisanship that facilitated the
removal from the workplace of lawyers‘ identities as people with
moral viewpoints.60
The Committee‘s work culminated in a draft of the Model Code
that was approved by the ABA House of Delegates in the summer of
1969 and went into effect in 1970.61 The Model Code was a significant
structural departure from the Canons: it was regulatory in nature
and bifurcated for the first time rules from ethical considerations.62
Instead of a prosaic format, the Wright Committee structured the
Model Code in statutory-style tiers. The Code grouped rules according to nine ―Canons.‖ that ―are basic to the proper functioning of the
legal profession in modern society.‖63 Each Canon had a onesentence-long overarching statement that began with the discretionary qualifier ―A lawyer should‖ and then proceeded to a statement
such as ―assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of law‖ or
―assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession.‖64 Following each of the header-style Canons were binding
mandatory ―Disciplinary Rules‖ (DRs)—created, as their name suggests, to discipline65—and accompanying, non-binding ―aspirational‖
―Ethical Considerations‖ (ECs) that were provided for guidance.66

59. Sutton, supra note 6, at 260 (official reporter for the Code writing on reasons supporting the Code‘s development).
60. In drafting the Model Code, the Committee deliberately sought ―a complete separation . . . between the inspirational and the proscriptive,‖ which they viewed as a ―substantial improvement.‖ Wright, supra note 10, 17; see also Sutton, supra note 6 , at 260
(―The creation of the ethical considerations-disciplinary rules bifurcation ends the structural difficulty. Now it can be stated that the law providing specific, authoritative standards for the advocate includes the disciplinary rules.‖).
61. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 19, at 617.
62. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 46 (3d ed. 2012); Hazard, supra note 7, at 1249-60; Sutton, supra note 6, at 258.
63. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Table of Contents (1980).
64. Id. at Canon 1, 3.
65. See Sutton, supra note 6, at 258.
66. Id. (stating that ethical considerations ―are designed to ‗appeal to the reason and
understanding of the lawyer‘ and to give guidance in those areas in which the lawyer is
free to exercise his own conscience without compulsion of law‖ (quoting John F. Sutton, Jr.,
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The Model Code quickly became the default measure of attorney
misconduct in federal courts; within a year of being presented to the
ABA, seventeen states had adopted the Model Code, and the large
majority of remaining states soon fell in line.67
Reformers heralded the Model Code as a moderate victory.68 In
retrospect, the Model Code that emerged in 1969 has been viewed as
an improvement from the preceding Canons.69 To many commentators then and now, the Model Code facilitated modern practice and
the diversifying demographic composition of the bar by increasing
transparency, modifying rules to allow more flexibility regarding referrals and advertising,70 and discussing a commitment to pro bono
work.71 The overall tone of the Model Code, particularly the preamble, echoed with civic aspirations.72 The Model Code remained at play
until the mid-eighties when its replacement, the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, was adopted by the ABA and eventually most
states.73 The Model Rules, like the Model Code before it, are codelike, legally enforceable, and also set a baseline of lawyer conduct
grounded in neutral partisanship.
III. CODIFICATION AND STRUCTURE
The advent of the Model Code was a watershed moment for American legal ethics. With it, the American bar eschewed a duty to engage in broad discussions of the lawyer‘s moral role in civil society for
a limited inquiry into what the proper regulatory rules should be to

Re-evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A Reviser’s Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV.
132, 133 (1966))).
67. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 62, at 46; Wright, supra note 10, at 1.
68. See Papke, supra note 17, at 43. See generally Sarah Ragle Weddington, A Fresh
Approach to Preserving Independent Judgment—Canon 6 of the Proposed Code of Professional Responsibility, 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 31 (1969) (praising rules delineating lawyers‘ duties
of loyalty).
69. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 62, at 46-47 (noting that ―the Model Code,
however, was an important advance‖); Sutton, supra note 6, at 266 (―[T]he Code of Professional Responsibility represents (in my perhaps biased judgment) a giant step forward in
the efforts of the legal profession to improve its ethical climate.‖).
70. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B), (D), (I) (1980); id. at DR
2-103(B), (D); id. at DR 2-140(A). Note, the greatest changes in this area came in subsequent revisions in response to the Supreme Court‘s ruling that lawyer advertising received
First Amendment protection as commercial speech in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977).
71. See id. at DR 2-101(B), (D), (I); id. at DR 2-103(B), (D); id. at DR 2-140(A).
72. See id. at Pmbl.
73. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 19, at 617. The Model Code was superseded by
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which were adopted by the ABA in
August 1983. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 108 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 763, 778 (1983).
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monitor day-to-day legal practice.74 This moment was pivotal because
it officially relegated issues of morality and lawyering to the ―academic‖ or ―personal‖ sphere and deemed such discussions irrelevant,
inappropriate, or even illegitimate in the context of the practicing
bar.75 While the rules did not bar discretionary consideration of morality, there was no requirement to weigh morality. The moral status
quo became the elephant in the room, obscured by the immediate
mandatory task of complying with disciplinary rules.76 Codification is
often associated with transparency and its attendant virtues: open
access, due process, and competition of ideas.77 Less emphasized,
however, is the impact of codification on operationalizing and enforcing norms that were previously unenforced.78 Enter the Model Code.
A. Rules Adopted; Ethics Orphaned
The Model Code‘s structure renders discussions of ethics and professional conduct conceptually and practically distinct.79 The Code
prioritized conduct rules over obligations to consider ethics. Conduct
rules received the distinction of being enforceable and therefore im74. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 62, at 46 (―The codification of the law governing lawyers in the 1960s marked a major change in the structure and content of the ethical
rules.‖); Hazard, supra note 7, at 1251 (―The transformation of the norms of professional
conduct [into an enforceable legal code] was principally effected by the ABA‘s Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970.‖).
75. This is not to say that discourse under the Canons actually centered more on substantive ethics. Certainly we have no evidence of a robust moral dialogue happening at the
bar level under the Canons. In fact, there is scholarship indicating that civic-mindedness
was actually in short supply. See generally Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1397 (2003). The key difference with the Code, however, is that the Canons aspired to a
notion of professional behavior that included and expected discussions of morality, regardless of whether those ideals were in fact realized.
76. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 1249 (―[T]he legal profession‘s narrative and the core
ethical rules, as pronounced in the 1908 Canons, has been preserved . . . . However, the
form in which those rules are expressed has changed dramatically. What were fraternal
norms issuing from an autonomous professional society have now been transformed into a
body of judicially enforced regulations.‖).
77. Indeed, according to the Committee Chair Wright, the shift to the Code format in
the Model Code was partially animated by a desire to create a fair system to incorporate
new members into the established norms of the legal profession: ―The Rules are drafted in
the form of statutes with specificity and clarity sufficient to meet due process requirements
of disciplinary actions.‖ Wright, supra note 10, at 2.
78. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 1250-51 (noting that integrating the bar as an aegis
of the courts allowed for ―intensified disciplinary enforcement, including the sanctions of
disbarment and suspension‖).
79. This distinction and the inclusion of ethical consideration with rules may have
been inspired by the Joint Conference Report, which noted that ―[u]nder the conditions of
modern practice it is particularly necessary that the lawyer should understand, not merely
the established standards of professional conduct, but the reasons underlying these standards.‖ Fuller & Randall, supra note 26, at 1159.
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portant.80 By structurally bifurcating ethical considerations from the
disciplinary rules, the Model Code made clear that ethical issues (to
the extent that they were discussed at all) were non-binding and ―aspirational.‖81 In adopting this format, the Model Code set the stage
for minimizing discussions of morality among practicing lawyers and
law students. Post-Model Code, the lawyerly inquiry is not ―What is
the right thing or the professional thing to do?‖ but ―Do the Disciplinary Rules sanction doing or not doing A, B, or C?‖82 Morality is relegated to an issue of private contemplation, rather than a topic for
group analysis.83 As such, the Model Code denied new entrants to legal practice the opportunity to discuss and change the moral norms
governing lawyering as a whole. Instead, professional discourse focused on the floor provided by regulatory rules, rather than the moral
ceiling.
In doing so, the bar was able to avoid a plurality of views concerning a lawyer‘s core ethical duties (thus side-stepping the Wright
Committee reporter‘s question, ―whose conscience and whose ethical
standards are to control?‖84). Instead, it froze the conversation as it
stood. Bifurcating moral issues from professional conduct allowed
current members of the bar to avoid uncomfortable conversations
with dissimilar colleagues. Meanwhile, discussions of the moral role
of lawyers and related duties to society would become increasingly
complicated as the bar diversified.

80. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980).
81. See Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics
of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the
Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV 411, 411 (2005) (arguing that the goals of the Model Code and
Model Rules‘ ― ‗minimalist‘ project‖ and the ― ‗broadly ethical‘ ‖ project conflict and therefore ―failed largely because the profession has divided what was once the single unifying
goal for bar associations and lawyer regulators—providing moral, ethical, and practical
guidance on how to practice law—into two quite distinct, and in some ways contradictory
goals, thus undercutting the entire project‖); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good
Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 41-46 (1995) (arguing that the regulatory focus of the codes has removed morality from ethics).
82. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 1241.
83. Some would argue that moral discussions still happen but in relation to the content of the rules, if not generally. I agree that (as with any law or code) moral arguments
may be raised in questioning the legitimacy of rules governing lawyer conduct. However,
these critiques center on the moral value of the specific rule at issue, and there is no requirement that morality be discussed generally amongst the bar or with clients or that
morality be reflected in the rules or conduct. Law often has a disconnect with moral judgment. But we do not call law ethics. Moreover, discussions regarding the reform of rules
will happen predominately in bar committees and subcommittees and in some cases among
regulators (Sarbanes-Oxley and related reforms), the elite, or academically inclined, not
amongst lawyers generally.
84. Sutton, supra note 6, at 259-60 (official reporter for the Code writing on reasons
supporting the Code‘s development).
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For example, a key point of contention facing the legal community
in the 1960s was the moral legitimacy of civil disobedience. During
the same years when the Wright Committee met and drafted the
Code, both ABA President Powell and former Justice Whittaker (a
member of the Wright Committee) spoke publically against civil disobedience as a means of social change.85 Instead, they called for
stronger government enforcement of criminal laws. One of their concerns was that a rise in disrespect for the law and general lawlessness would undermine ―the good order and morality of our society.‖86
Whittaker in particular was skeptical of demonstrations and questioned the motivations of civil rights protesters. He argued that ―certain self-appointed racial leaders, doubtless recalling the appeasements and, hence, successes of that earlier conduct, have simply
adopted and used those techniques in fomenting and waging their
lawless campaigns which they have called ‗demonstrations.‘ ‖87
Justice Whittaker stated that ―we must always strive to eliminate
injustice and discrimination.‖88 However, he disagreed with nonviolent civil disobedience demonstrators about how to achieve that
goal. He argued that ―we must do so by orderly processes in the legislatures and the courts, and not by defying their processes and actions, nor by taking the laws into our own hands.‖89 Tellingly, Justice
Whittaker‘s writings on the subject lack awareness of institutional
bias. He urged minorities to make use of the court system without
acknowledging that the laws to which minorities are expected to
show allegiance were often formed without their input and in violation of fundamental constitutional and moral principles.90 Likewise,
there is no apparent cognizance of how judicial entities themselves are
entrenched in their own norms, norms that may foreclose the possibility of meaningful redress through conventional legal processes. Rather,

85. Concerned about civil disobedience‘s ability to ―seriously threaten the breakdown
of law, order, and morality,‖ Charles Whittaker, in an address originally given to the Tennessee Bar Association, called for ―impartial, evenhanded, vigorous, swift and certain enforcement of our criminal laws, and the real and substantial punishment thereunder of all
conduct that violates those laws.‖ 111 CONG. REC. 15101-03 (1965) (introduced into the
record by Sen. Strom Thurmond); id. at 15103 (arguing that ―[n]o ‗end‘ . . . however worthy
[can ever] justify resort to unlawful means‖ and that ―America needs a genuine revival of
respect for law and orderly process . . . a new impatience with those who violate and circumvent the laws, and a determined insistence that laws be enforced‖ (alterations in original)).
86. Id. at 15102.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 15101-03.
89. Id. at 15103.
90. See id.
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Justice Whittaker argued that complying with the law and upholding
legal institutions is the sole legitimate path to effectuate change.91
In the above example, the moral inquiry asks whether a lawyer
owes a moral duty to follow the law even when the law is unjust.
Members of the Committee viewed this as a potential clash, one
where some lawyers would be more willing to assert that unjust laws
are not entitled to automatic compliance. Such lawyers could argue
that compliance with an unjust law is, in fact, immoral. Under the
Model Code, practicing lawyers need not have this discussion or resolve this issue with their colleagues. The focus on the disciplinary
rules made clear that lawyers need only discuss what is proper conduct in the service of clients, not whether or not clients ought to be
prioritized over other societal obligations or whether lawyers should
in fact consider the morality of the laws they are instrumental in
implementing.
The avoidance of moral discussions in the professional context has
continued to this day. The discussion of legal ethics in law schools is
almost entirely rule-based.92 ―Legal Ethics‖ as a course name is often
a misnomer for continuing legal education and law school courses
that teach not frameworks for considering the moral implications or
obligations of practice, but, rather, teach the predominantly codebased law of lawyering.93 To the extent that lawyers consider the
bounds of their duties to society, their clients, and the legal system, it
is primarily, and perhaps only, in terms of complying with formal
laws and regulations.94 From the ratification of the Model Code on91. See id. (―We must . . . seek redress in the courts rather than in the streets.‖).
92. This is partially due to the sweeping mandate of the ABA‘s accreditation provisions for the mandatory ethics course in law school which requires treatment of ―the history, goals, structures, values, and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members.‖
A.B.A., THE 2012-2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS Standard 302(a)(5), at 15 (2012).
93. In required CLE and law school courses on ―legal ethics‖ there is little need, and
certainly no requirement, to discuss morality. Of a survey of thirty-one textbooks on the
subject of legal ethics and professional responsibility on the current market in 2013, fewer
than half even use the term ―ethics‖ in their titles. See also Maksymilian Del Mar, Beyond
Text in Legal Education: Art, Ethics, and the Carnegie Report, 56 LOY. L. REV. 955, 976-77
(2010) (noting that professional responsibility and ethics courses in law school do not address moral concerns but focus instead on the regulation of law practice); Deborah L.
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 649 (1985) (―Legal
ethics should be taught as ethics, not as etiquette or statutory exegesis. Law school courses
and bar examinations that demand rote memorization of official standards merely trivialize the subject matter.‖).
94. The Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, which is required for entrance
to the bar in most states, tests most heavily on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Overview of the MPRE, NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF
BAR EXAM‘RS, http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/mpre/overview-of-the-exam/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2015).
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wards, the term ―ethics‖ is not even in the titles of the ABA rules
governing the legal profession.95
The division of ethics from rules in the Model Code presented morality as an issue outside of the lawyer‘s professional responsibility or
training, a personal discretionary issue, without a clear place in professional discourse or the workplace. While the Canons‘ moral validity was highly flawed,96 the ideal of lawyering perpetuated by the
Canons required a consideration of moral issues. An attorney could
not be a good lawyer and fail to consider (and act on) morality.97 In
contrast, the neutral-partisan model in the Model Code and in the
Model Rules today allows an individual to be a good lawyer and not
weigh or act on morality at all. The model of lawyering that comes
from the Model Code sets the expectation that lawyers will act as
―amoral‖ agents.98 Yes, lawyers can exercise discretion to go above
and beyond what is required of them as lawyers and consider morality (as many do). But the fact is that they are not required to. This
shift relegated legal ethics qua ethics to the ivory tower of academia
and personal, rather than professional, discourse.
Taking moral discussions off the table for lawyers also meant that
lawyers unsympathetic to new viewpoints avoided the need to reconsider or modify their own practice. The proper role of lawyers in society was beyond group revision. Moral condemnation of the basic role
of lawyer as client conduit was out of place. Instead, the focus on dayto-day conduct allowed the existing bar to shield the client-centric
neutral-partisan model from serious attack while focusing discussion
on disciplinary rules. This move conceded broad conceptual and moral
issues to the status quo. The neutral-partisanship model allowed
members of the bar to avoid awkward discussions regarding their personal views with dissimilar colleagues because it assumes that a lawyer‘s personal morality remains separate from achieving client goals.99

95. Compare ABA CANONS OF PROF‘L ETHICS (1908), with MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L
RESPONSIBILITY (1980), and MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT (1983).
96. To be clear, this is not a call to reinstate the Canons. Others have called more
generally for return to the Canons, whereas I am making a more limited claim. See Barton,
supra note 81, at 434-36.
97. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
98. As I discuss in detail infra Part III, there is no such thing as an amoral lawyer;
the amoral lawyering ideal is imbued with rich moral judgments regarding agency, duty,
societal norms, and expectations regarding human behavior.
99. It is worth noting that new members to the bar from outside of traditional professional circles are not spared discomfort under this model; rather, their discomfort may be
increased in a system where topics available for discussion or redress forgo challenges to
moral concerns in the context of professional practice.
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B. Enforceability: The Model Code and Discipline
As the demographic composition of the legal profession grew more
inclusive, longstanding members of the bar could no longer rely on
common experiences of education and upbringing, unspoken norms,
or societal connections to predict (and control) the behaviors of other
lawyers who moved in different social circles.100 The Model Code created a national code of conduct with mandatory regulations specifically designed to increase enforceability over parties outside the ambit of the social circles of the existing bar.101 In doing so, the Code
―transformed the dominant bar associations directly involved in bar
discipline from private clubs into quasi-governmental organs.‖102 As
such, the drafting of the Model Code did more than fend off encroachment by the court on traditional self-regulation;103 it revealed the existing bar‘s increasing skepticism of the rapidly growing lawyer population‘s ability to conform to norms without external consequences.
Newly anointed standards were given teeth. In the pre-Code era,
―[t]he threat of professional discipline was virtually non-existent, as
long as the lawyer did not commit a felony or a similarly egregious
offense. The threat of legal malpractice recovery or of a remedy such
as disqualification for a conflict of interest was almost as equally remote.‖104 The disciplinary norms changed drastically post-Model
Code. The Model Code provided a disciplinary workhorse to keep
lawyers in line with dominant lawyering norms, rather than facilitating revision of these norms. Since 1969, lawyer regulation through
the bar, courts, and malpractice litigation has risen significantly.105
While some of this increase can be attributed to doctrinal shifts in
100. The Model Code‘s disciplinary rules ―functioned as a statute defining legal contours of a vocation whose practitioners were connected primarily by having been licensed to
practice law.‖ Hazard, supra note 7, at 1241, 1244, 1251, 1260 (going on to note that ―[b]y
the 1980‘s, the bar had become a ‗community‘ of strangers‖).
101. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 1 (―It was not until 1969, with the advent of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, that American jurisdictions began to take the
function of regulating lawyers seriously.‖).
102. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 217; see also Hazard, supra note 7, at 1241 (―[T]he legal
profession‘s narrative and the core ethical rules, as pronounced in the 1908 Canons, has
been preserved and largely unchanged . . . . However, the form in which those rules are
expressed has changed dramatically. What were fraternal norms issuing from an autonomous professional society have now been transformed into a body of judicially enforced
regulations.‖).
103. In the 1960s there was increased pressure from courts on the self-governance
norm as they increasingly took an increased interest in shaping the profession‘s governing
rules. Hazard, supra note 7, at 1242.
104. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 207.
105. ―While the absence of meaningful records precludes the generation of statistics of
the extent of lawyer discipline prior to 1970, my distinct impression, in agreement with the
bar‘s self-assessment, is that there was much less regulation compared to today.‖ Id. at 206.
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third party standing,106 the growth of a plaintiffs‘ legal malpractice
bar may also indicate a sense that the presence of a law-like code
clarified the breach standards needed for conformity with the customs
of the profession. More than forty years later, lawyers now comprise a
highly regulated profession subject to direct statutory regulation and
self-regulation as well as various common law regulations.107
IV. STANDARDIZING THE STANDARD CONCEPTION
The previous sections established a history of ideas—why neutral
partisanship was adopted as a dominant model for lawyering in modernity (to facilitate pluralism) and what form that adoption took
(the bifurcation of rules from ethics). The historic roots of the Model
Code indicate a perceived need to avoid conflict and excise debates
about morality from the legal profession in order to facilitate demographic plurality at the bar. This Part explores the conceptual and
practical shortcomings of that choice by problematizing arguments
that neutral partisanship is (1) anti-hierarchical and pro-client and
(2) neutral to moral judgments.
The Model Code does not (and cannot) remove moral judgment
from the code. Rather, by adopting and strengthening a commitment
to neutral partisanship, the Model Code preserved the moral choices
that predated the Code and limited the ability to change or alter
those choices moving forward. Despite its appeal to universality, neutrality is not neutral. It favors one approach to lawyering over all
others.108 Because it is viewpoint specific but does not facilitate dialogue on the content of that viewpoint, neutral partisanship deemphasizes and delegitimizes the individual moral contributions of new
diverse lawyers by limiting value pluralism.
As such, the desire to avoid conflict in the bar did not eliminate
moral conflict. Instead, the Model Code pushes conflict out of sight,
where it is harder to investigate. Such suppressed struggles cause
106. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
107. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48
RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 102 (1995) (―Increasingly, professional ideals have been turned into
enforceable law, and self-regulation by the organized bar has become regulation by courts
and legislatures.‖); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1229, 1275 (1995) (noting that the existence of disciplinary regulation and substantial
regulatory law, including ―tort law, criminal law, agency law, and securities law,‖ belies
the notion that lawyers are self-regulating); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 206; Zacharias, supra note 7, at 1 (―The publication of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility was a
watershed event beginning a flood of ethics regulation that has yet to subside.‖).
108. For example, neutral partisanship leaves little room for lawyering rooted in empathy, care, and emotions. See generally Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law
and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997 (2010).

2014]

THE COST OF AVOIDANCE

171

significant harm to lawyers as individuals as well as to relationships
between lawyers and between lawyers and clients. Neutral partisanship is also ill-suited to help a diverse bar that services diverse clients to negotiate real moral and practical dilemmas. This Part concludes that the Model Code, as the basis of our modern legal ethics
system, does not adequately respond to demographic and value pluralism. As such, it cannot be justified on the terms of its adoption.
A. Neutral Partisanship: A Primer
Neutral partisanship is typically called the ―standard conception‖
of the lawyer‘s role, amoral lawyering or, in the pejorative, the lawyer as a ―hired gun.‖109 Partisanship is the concept that the lawyer,
within the boundaries of the law, ―is committed to the aggressive and
single-minded pursuit of the client‘s objectives.‖110 Partisanship exists
primarily in adversarial systems.111 Neutrality is a distinct concept; it
requires that lawyers refrain from moral judgment over the lawful
ends of the client or the lawful means used to attain those goals.112
Under the standard conception, lawyers are ―role-differentiated.‖
This means that lawyers must confine their individual moral views to
their personal roles in life (outside of the workplace).113 Ideally, law109. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 26 (1854); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional
Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73 (1980); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 210 (describing clientcentric lawyering as ―the bedrock of modern professional orthodoxy‖).
110. TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A DEFENSE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION
OF THE LAWYER‘S ROLE 5 (2009).
111. This Article does not interrogate the adversarial or partisan nature of the standard conception‘s ―neutral partisan‖ norm, but instead focuses on the neutrality aspect of
this concept. Many scholars have critiqued the pitfalls of partisanship and particularly the
use of the adversarial system. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY
19-64 (2007) (revising Luban‘s 1983 essay and critiquing the premise that the adversarial
system better pursues truth or the client‘s interest); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble
with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
5 (1996). But see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS‘ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9, 12
(1975) (championing the adversary system as protective of individuals‘ fundamental rights
and emphasizing the importance of partisanship and neutrality); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984) (advocating for the adversary
system). However, these concepts are analytically distinct: concepts of partisanship and
neutrality need not be married with one another. This Article focuses on problems imbedded with neutrality and role morality, not partisanship.
112. See Postema, supra note 109, at 73. For views critical of this approach, see Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the
Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 247 (1985); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as
Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1979); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988); William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
113. See, e.g., Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 15-16 (1951)
(―[Lawyers] are not dealing with the morals which govern a man acting for himself, but
with the ethics of advocacy. We are talking about the special moral code which governs a
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yers leave their professional role devoid of moral judgment and remain preoccupied only with questions of legality.114 As such, neutral
partisanship provides moral non-accountability for lawyers: the client, not the lawyer, is culpable for the moral worth of ends sought in
a representation.115 Many refer to this concept as ―role morality‖ since
morality, or at least moral accountability, is cabined to specific
roles.116 Neutral partisanship in some form is a time-honored concept,
one that some scholars trace back as far as the early 1800s.117
The Canons‘ version of neutral partisanship was qualified and favored lawyers employing their own morality in the context of client
advocacy. While the Canons required lawyers to act as zealous advocates for their clients, they also cautioned that a lawyer ―must obey
his own conscience and not that of the client.‖118 The Canons reminded lawyers that ―no client has a right to demand that his counsel
shall be illiberal, or that he do anything therein repugnant to his own
sense of honor and propriety.‖119 Moreover, under the Canons, a lawyer had a duty to ―impress upon the client and his undertaking exact
compliance with the strictest principles of moral law.‖120 The Canons
concluded that a lawyer finds their ―highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest
man and as a patriotic citizen,‖ not exclusively in the service of a
client.121
The Model Code, in contrast, made a much stronger commitment
to neutral partisanship.122 In it, the Wright Committee sought to
eliminate what it perceived as a key ―dilemma‖ imbedded in the Canman who is acting for another. Lawyers in their practice—how they behave elsewhere does
not concern us—put off more and more of our common morals the farther they go in a profession which treats right and wrong, vice and virtue, on such equal terms.‖).
114. See David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEX. L. REV. 673, 673-74 (2012) (describing the position of W. Bradley Wendel in Lawyers and Fidelity to Law regarding the proper
role of a lawyer).
115. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 614 (―[C]onduct by the lawyer in service to the client
is judged by a different moral standard than the same conduct by a layperson. . . . [I]t is
the client who is morally accountable, not the lawyer.‖).
116. Luban, supra note 114, at 674 (noting that the central question regarding role
morality is, ―how can it be that her professional role might require a lawyer to do things
that would be morally forbidden to a non-lawyer?‖).
117. DARE, supra note 110, at 6 (2009) (discussing Lord Brougham‘s famous speech in
defense of Queen Caroline, pronouncing that in the discharge of his duty a lawyer ―knows
but one person in all the world, and that person is his client‖).
118. Final Report, supra note 18, at 579.
119. Id. at 582.
120. Id. at 584.
121. Id. at 584.
122. See Papke, supra note 17, at 43 (―[F]ramers of the code reasserted the responsibility
of individual lawyers to individual clients. Established ethical presumptions died hard.‖).
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ons: ―whether to represent [a lawyer‘s] client in accordance with [the]
law or in accordance with the lawyer‘s own moral viewpoint.‖123 While
the official reporter of the Model Code, John Sutton, admitted that
there was ―considerable professed support‖ for the view that a lawyer
should ―obey his own conscience,‖124 he dismissed it as a ―standardless maelstrom‖ governed by ―whims, prejudices, emotional caprices,
and predilections.‖125
The Model Code avoided this concern by making only very limited
mention of moral responsibility on the part of lawyers. These mentions appear in the non-binding ―ethical considerations,‖ not the
mandatory disciplinary rules, where the ethical considerations merely state that it is ―desirable‖ for a lawyer to point out morally just
outcomes to clients.126 The clients themselves decide the course of action. This side-steps a lawyer‘s moral accountability.127 For example,
some scholars have argued that the Model Code forbids trial lawyers
to even express an opinion as to the moral value of their client‘s
case.128 Even in the area of deciding whether or not to take on certain
clients, where lawyers under the Canons had previously enjoyed an
unqualified right to refuse clients,129 the Model Code admonished
such behavior. It declared that ―a lawyer should not lightly decline
proffered employment.‖130
Additional commitments to client-centric neutral partisanship are
clear in several sections of Model Code. One of the mandatory disciplinary rules states that ―[a] lawyer shall not intentionally fail to
seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available
means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules.‖131 Canon 7 of
the Model Code, although not binding in the way the Disciplinary
Rules are, reiterates this approach: ―A lawyer should represent a client
zealously within the boundaries of the law.‖132 In the non-binding ―ethical‖ authorities, lawyers are advised that ―[t]he professional judgment
123. Sutton, supra note 6, at 260.
124. Final Report, supra note 18, at 579.
125. Sutton, supra note 6, at 259.
126. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (―A lawyer should bring to
bear upon this decision-making process the fullness of his experience as well as his objective
viewpoint. In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to
point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible.‖).
127. See id. at EC 7-8, 7-9.
128. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 393 (1988).
129. Final Report, supra note 18, at 583-84 (which emphasizes a lawyer‘s ―right to decline employment‖).
130. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26 (1980).
131. Id. at DR 7-101(A)(1).
132. Id. at EC 7-1.
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of a lawyer should be exercised . . . solely for the benefit of [the lawyer‘s] client and free of compromising influences and loyalties.‖133
B. A Modern Moral Justification of Neutral Partisanship
Traditionally, champions of neutral partisanship defend it in
pragmatic terms by arguing that neutral partisanship upholds the
integrity of the adversarial system.134 Under these types of arguments, a lawyer must take a neutral role as an advocate for her client
in order to ascertain the truth and safeguard the public interest in
the institutional integrity of the overall legal system.135 This view argues that allowing lawyers to exercise moral autonomy and judge the
goals of the client‘s lawsuit undermines the functioning of the adversarial judicial system as a whole, either by usurping the roles of the
judge and jury or by undermining the system‘s ability to fact find.136
In its briefest form, such proponents argue that an adversary system
founded on neutral partisanship is the best way to ensure that truth
is found and that cases are judged on their merits.137 A more cynical
argument holds that neutral partisanship is simply a quid pro quo
bargain for retaining a monopoly over professional legal services.138
All of these justifications and critiques of neutral partisanship are
premised on the basic assumption that existing institutions of law,
justice, and government are legitimate themselves and worth protecting. However, in the late sixties and seventies, when the Model Code
was written and ratified and subsequent iterations of national rulemaking were underway, skepticism of such institutions was wide-

133. Id. at EC 5-1.
134. See FREEDMAN, supra note 111, at 9, 12 (championing the client-centric adversary
system as protecting the fundamental rights of individuals and emphasizing the importance of partisanship and neutrality); LANDSMAN, supra note 111 (advocating for the
adversary system). See generally Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (―[Our]
system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in
truth and fairness.‖); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (―[O]ur legal tradition
regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the
risk of error.‖).
135. See Papke, supra note 17, at 38 (―Sharswood argued that the lawyer was not responsible for the social utility of the cause he represented. If the lawyer began judging
cases on his own, he would be usurping the powers of judge and jury who, more so than
lawyers, carried a responsibility to the public at large.‖).
136. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTS. 1, 10-11 (1975) (contending that ―[i]f lawyers were to substitute their own private
views of what ought to be legally permissible and impermissible for those of the legislature
this would constitute a surreptitious and undesirable shift from a democracy to an oligarchy of lawyers‖).
137. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 26, at 1160-61.
138. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 616.
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spread.139 Justifications predicated on protecting existing institutions
and on the moral integrity of such instructions were questionable—
perhaps even untenable. Instead, another moral justification of neutral partisanship was necessary—one resting on contemporary political ideals such as equality, diversity, and individual access to power.
It is on these bases that neutral partisanship needed to stake its
claim in order to solidify its position as the default model of lawyering in modern America.
Responding to the political and social climate of post-sixties America, modern moral justifications for neutral partisanship emerged
grounded in the language and causes of the civil rights movement:
individual rights, diversity, and equality.140 This moral footing for
neutral partisanship is best articulated in Stephen Pepper‘s seminal
article The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and
Some Possibilities.141
In the amoral lawyering account, neutral partisanship forwards
the cause of the disenfranchised better than a morally active lawyer
role because it allows the voice of the client to achieve its full legal
ends unimpeded by the lawyer‘s own moral viewpoint.142 Since these
values had inherent moral worth, so too did a role of lawyering conceived to protect such interests.143 A lack of sophistication on the part
of many clients justifies the lawyer‘s amoral role:

139. See Andrew Kohut, Forward to PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE
PRESS, DECONSTRUCTING DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW GOVERNMENT (1998) (noting
how in the sixties and seventies a ―healthy skepticism‖ toward government ―deteriorated
into an outright distrust‖).
140. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 613 (stating that neutral partisanship is morally
justified, ―primarily upon the values of individual autonomy, equality and diversity‖). For
the purposes of this Article, I ask the reader to take as given that the ideals of individual
autonomy, equality, and diversity are moral goals. While I realize that the moral worth of
each of these is subject to debate, this Article considers, if we take Professor Pepper‘s categorization of these goals as valid, what does and should follow. See generally GERALD
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988) (―[A]utonomy is . . . a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of
higher-order preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define their
nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of
person they are.‖).
141. Pepper, supra note 11, at 613. Professor Pepper‘s article is a cornerstone of the
modern legal ethics canon. A recent search of LexisNexis revealed that, in addition to being
cited in numerous legal ethics anthologies and textbooks, Pepper‘s article has been cited
over three hundred times since 1986.
142. Pepper is concerned that lawyers will act as ―moral screens‖ obscuring client autonomy. Id. at 621.
143. Staunch individualism has a long history in American political mythology. The Model Code‘s own opening sentence states that ―[t]he continued existence of a free and democratic
society depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law
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[U]nfiltered access to the law is then available only to those who
are legally sophisticated and to those able to educate themselves
sufficiently for access to the law, while those less sophisticated—
usually those less educated—are left with no access or with access
that subjects their use of the law to the moral judgments and veto
of the lawyer.144

Under this view neutral partisanship is necessary in a pluralistic
society to safeguard the masses from the oppressive oligarchy of the
lawyer class.145 Justifying neutral partisanship in these terms presented reform-minded lawyers with an argument in favor of strict role
differentiation rooted in their own values. The idea that different
views and parties would coexist best by seeking a neutral baseline for
lawyer conduct has a certain intuitive appeal.
Proponents of neutral partisanship, in service of pluralism, equality, and diversity argued that in a pluralistic society moral lawyers
not only may, they must differentiate their personal selves from their
professional ones in order to allow various client views to filter into
the system: ―The lawyer is a good person in that he provides access to
the law; in providing such access without moral screening he serves
the moral values of individual autonomy and equality.‖146 Since ―liberty and autonomy are a moral good,‖ so too is neutral partisanship,
which is ―better than constraint.‖147 Under this theory, if given a
choice, diversity and autonomy are so morally valuable that they
trump general pursuits of ―right‖ or ―good‖ conduct.148 Thus, ―[f]or access to law to be filtered unequally through the disparate moral views
of each individual‘s lawyer does not appear to be justifiable.‖149
However intuitive, this assertion fails upon closer scrutiny. Clientcentric neutral partisanship cannot be adequately justified in terms
of defending client autonomy, equality, or diversity since it ultimately undermines each of these concepts in important and irreconcilable

grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-government.‖ MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Pmbl. (1980).
144. Pepper, supra note 11, at 619.
145. See id. at 617 (arguing that neutral partisanship facilitates a diversity of clients to
play out their individual autonomy in an unimpeded fashion without ―substitut[ing] lawyers‘ beliefs‖).
146. Pepper, supra note 11, at 634.
147. Id. at 616.
148. In Professor Pepper‘s view, equality of access to law is also a ―significant value‖
worthy of such extreme protection and one that the neutral-partisan model champions. Id.
at 616.
149. Id. at 618.
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ways.150 The following sections examine these shortcomings both conceptually and pragmatically.
C. Neutral Partisanship as a Vehicle for Client Autonomy
The idea that exercises of individual autonomy in accordance with
law are an unequivocal moral good is a subject of debate. One danger
of this assertion is that it ―would conflate the morality of the action
with the morality of autonomously having chosen it.‖151 Professor David Luban notes this is particularly problematic because ―some things
[that are] legally right are not morally right.‖152 In contrast, amoral
lawyering ―assumes that the morality is already in the law, that in
any important sense anything legally right is morally right.‖153 In order for this to be true, neutral partisanship under the amoral lawyering view would carry an extreme libertarian view that any infringement on individual freedom is so morally repugnant as to outweigh
the moral downfalls of the content of that act.
Additional arguments regarding the modern amoral lawyering
rationale are grounded in practice; even if an individual makes a
choice for a given outcome, if the ability to reach that outcome is fundamentally compromised by her relationship with her lawyer, then the
client‘s exercise of autonomy does not exist in any meaningful way.154
This section contends that regardless of perfect access to amoral law-

150. See, e.g., W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 4, 11 (2010) (arguing that a modified version of neutral partisanship that places fidelity to legal entitlements
rather than client interests is essential in a value pluralistic society since law represents ―a
provisional settlement of these controversies, to enable cooperative action in response to
some collective need‖ and that ―[t]here is moral value in doing one‘s part to support a socially valuable institution‖). I reserve discussion of the issue of whether this modified version of neutral partisanship would succeed in terms of defending pluralism and focus here
on assessing the more conventional version of neutral partisanship at play in the Model
Code and incorporated into subsequent rulemaking.
151. Id. at 33.
152. David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 11 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 638 (1986) (―[S]ome things legally right are not morally right.‖
(quoting Abraham Lincoln)).
153. Id.
154. For the purposes of this Article, I will assume, as most legal ethics codes do, that
good lawyering includes loyalty to one‘s client as well as communication and candor between the lawyer and her client. As of July 2014, all jurisdictions in the United States include provisions that outline a duty of loyalty, communication, and candor towards clients
in some form. It is a matter of live dispute, however, whether such duties, or any duties,
should run to clients versus the law, human dignity, or an overall sense of substantive
justice. The amoral lawyering stance discusses individual autonomy in terms of clients,
and therefore this Article will approach the standard conception from the point of view that
is now, in the post-Code era, most widely accepted—a client-centric model.

178

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:151

yers, the neutral-partisan ideal would continue to be suspect under justifications grounded in diversity, equality, and individual autonomy.155
1. Candor, Loyalty, and Effective Client Service
Many would include zeal as an essential element of good lawyering.156 Here lies an inherent weakness in neutral partisanship: it undermines loyalty and the trust of clients in their lawyers. This inhibits the ability of lawyers and clients to have a relationship with a
meaningful implementation of loyalty, communication, and candor.157
By being willing, for pay, to set aside one‘s personal principles and
views, lawyers undermine their moral standing and forfeit credibility
with laypeople.158 Then, those same laypeople are put in the uncomfortable position of having to trust a party they know to be, by all
typical standards, untrustworthy. Without the candor that comes
with trust, a lawyer cannot build an effective case and relationship
with a client. Thus, the amoral lawyering model frequently handicaps a lawyer from effective practice and even client service.
The idea that clients can exercise unimpeded autonomy through a
neutral-partisan model of lawyering is undercut by the relationship
between trust, empathy, and candor.159 People come to lawyers in
times of great vulnerability, often when something of critical importance in their lives is awry.160 Clients want to trust their lawyers.161 Yet a lawyer who complies with her duties as delineated by
155. I concede that in a non-adversarial system, neutrality might be more defensible.
This Article argues within, and to some extent assumes as given, our current system—an
adversarial one grounded in client-centric work. For the reasons hinted at below, I have
serious concerns about the moral worth of non-adversarial judicial systems in deliberative
democracies, though I would agree with other scholars that client focus should potentially
yield to other loyalties and is likely better conceptualized as a duty ―to protect the legal
entitlements of clients, not advance their interests.‖ WENDEL, supra note 150, at 6.
156. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165 (2006).
But see LUBAN, supra note 111, at 19-64 (revising Luban‘s 1983 essay).
157. See, e.g., Irma S. Russell, Keeping the Wheels on the Wagon: Observations on Issues of Legal Ethics for Lawyers Representing Business Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 513,
522 (2003) (―[T]he lawyer who bites his tongue rather than voice the unpleasant argument
against a client‘s course of action fails more than his own conscience; he fails to fulfill the
foundational duty of providing candid legal advice.‖).
158. Perhaps this is why the media valorizes lawyers who break with professional ethics
and instead comport with expectations of common morality. See Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 386 (1987).
159. The Oxford English Dictionary defines empathy as ―[t]he . . . power of projecting
one‘s personality into [and so fully comprehending the] . . . object of contemplation.‖
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). Since lawyers, under a neutral-partisan ideal,
seek to treat their personal selves as irrelevant, empathy is out of place.
160. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 615.
161. See generally COREY S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE
LAWYERING, LOW-INCOME CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE (2009) (citing
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the Model Code can greet them with a complete lack of sympathy or
empathy—in fact, they are expected to do just that. Lawyers, by separating their personal selves strictly from their professional selves,
appear ―heartless,‖ only in the representation to receive fees and
therefore only looking out for their own personal material interest.162
A lack of aligned interests may also impact the ability of a lawyer to
engage in competent representation. If a lawyer believes in the case
of her client, then she is genuinely motivated to be timely, diligent,
and creative and to work hard to reach the client‘s goals. Alignment
of interests may also support competency, as ―[t]here are severe limitations on the extent to which a person, particularly a stranger, can
understand with any depth the ends of another without actually
sharing those ends.‖163 But instead of expecting lawyers only to take
on cases that comport with their ordinary moral views, lawyers are
expected to represent all clients zealously without believing in the
outcomes of their cases.
2. Codifying Trust: The Model Code’s Bind
Neutral partisanship creates the situation where the Model Code
must artificially attempt to emulate qualities of actual loyalty-based
relationships through piecemeal rubrics. The Model Code states that
lawyers must be loyal, diligent, and competent with client‘s work and
represent the client with zeal.164 The Model Code attempts to deal
with the disconnect between role differentiation and traditional loyalty by crafting a set of contorted rules that have only become more
painfully strained and convoluted over time. Much of the Code attempts to regulate and create mechanically what can only grow out of
a genuine alignment of interests: trust and loyalty.165

interviews of clients expressing that friendship and trust were at the forefront of what they
wanted from lawyers).
162. ―Greed‖ is a common term that arises in public descriptions of lawyers. See Paul F.
Teich, Are Lawyers Truly Greedy? An Analysis of Relevant Empirical Evidence, 19 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 837, 847 (2013); see also Marianne M. Jennings, Moral Disengagement
and Lawyers: Codes, Ethics, Conscience, and Some Great Movies, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 573, 57576 (―[M]oral disengagement still creates an ethical pressure cooker from which there is no
release.‖).
163. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 59 n.70; see also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (emphasizing
how a personal relationship between a client and her attorney can enable the exercise of
autonomy within the legal system).
164. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980) (client confidences);
id. at DR 6-101 (competence and diligence); id. at DR 7-101 (zeal).
165. See generally id. at Canon 6 (laying out detailed instructions regarding conflicts of
interest).
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However, trust between people is ordinarily predicated on honesty
and mutuality. It requires candid disclosure of beliefs and the mutual
vulnerability attendant to that disclosure. No amount of mechanical
rulemaking can counter the lack of mutual openness in building
trust. Therefore, if the legal profession truly believes that client candor is essential to representation in an adversarial system, then a
failure to discuss, disclose, and act in keeping with a lawyer‘s autonomy undermines a key aspect of representation. Clients will trust
lawyers who are telling them the truth about themselves and being
forthcoming with their views. In contrast, the neutral-partisanship
model asks clients to do what lawyers themselves are unwilling to
do—be open.
Ultimately, rules can only give assurance to clients who have faith
in rules, rule of law, and the fair execution of law. Proxy loyalty is
little more than a house of cards built upon certain assumptions regarding human experience: that clients will enter a relationship with
a lawyer believing that law and rules are reliable, fair, and justly enforced. For many clients, particularly less enfranchised individuals or
non-institutional clients, the inverse view of the reliability of rules
and law is just as likely as such faith.
Ultimately, client autonomy is best served by lawyers who genuinely believe in clients and their causes. Neutral partisanship divorces lawyers from this rich sense of loyalty that flows organically from
aligned interests. Instead, clients must trust in rule of law, the code
of lawyers, and the court to enforce formalistic loyalty. This is not a
neutral assumption, it is one made from a point of view colored by
experiences with the law as a benign facilitator rather than an obstruction or tool of persecution. Lawyers are expected to act with
conviction, but not have actual conviction. This leaves only one active
word—lawyers must ―act.‖ Thus, lawyers are expected not only to be
advocates, but actors that give convincing imitations of loyalty and
candor without conviction. This undermines the profession‘s stature
and credibility in the public eye. By adopting a strong version of neutral partisanship, the Model Code created a perverse system where
only clients who are themselves ―amoral‖ (either through role differentiation or an antisocial tendency to aver moral norms) gain the
full benefit of an open relationship with their lawyers and full effective representation.
3. Clients and the Knowledge Deficit
Even if the Model Code managed to emulate loyalty effectively,
neutral partisanship obscures a lawyer‘s actual agenda and views,
again disadvantaging clients. By allowing lawyers to claim moral distinction from their client‘s ends, lawyers inhabit a professional iden-
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tity steeped in ambiguity. The client ought to be able to choose counsel knowing what her lawyer actually thinks of the moral content of
the suit at hand.166 In a value-pluralistic society, it is likely that a
client would find relevant what his lawyer really thinks of the moral
validity of his case. However, the current system forces clients to
make choices regarding their representation without knowledge of a
lawyer‘s moral view on the substantive issues. The client is required
to trust that a lawyer‘s personal views will not undermine the representation. This impedes, rather than empowers, client autonomy.
The client deserves, and arguably needs, to know what her lawyer
believes. It is often vital for clients to know whether or not the lawyer
is truly invested in the client‘s legal goal or only performs a series of
mechanically required acts as if she cared about the client.167 With
such information at hand, the client, not the lawyer, can decide
whether or not she is comfortable with a lawyer who does or does not
share her moral views. This decision ought to lie with the client, at
least under a view privileging client autonomy. Right now, only the
lawyer knows of this potential disconnect, and the standard conception of lawyering paternalistically decides that this information is not
relevant to the client (conveniently allowing an attorney to take on
clients with conflicting moral positions for her own financial gain).
Rather than allowing a lawyer to determine her impartiality (the fox
guarding the henhouse), the rules could require that a lawyer reveal
to the client any moral viewpoints on the representation she may
have, allowing the client to consider these issues and waive any conflicts should the client feel that the lawyer, nonetheless, would be an
excellent advocate.
Under a neutral-partisan system, the service that some clients
receive will also be systematically better than that of others. The parties best served by the profession‘s allegiance to the concept of role
morality are those clients who are also disciples of the ―neutral partisan‖ ethos. Clients who share the morally-charged view that parties
or entities may separate professional activities from moral accountability are given the privilege (and advantage) of having a lawyer with
genuinely aligned interests. But shouldn‘t ordinary individual cli-

166. It is never possible to have complete knowledge in a given representation, even on
the part of a lawyer. See, e.g., Spaulding, supra note 11, at 1384 (―[L]awyers know that
their advice and advocacy will almost never be based on anything approaching complete
knowledge.‖). However, calculated and sanctioned failure to disclose information is a different matter.
167. Anne E. Thar, What Do Clients Really Want? It’s Time You Found Out, 87 ILL. B.J.
331 (1999) (reporting that more than skill or knowledge, what clients wanted from a lawyer was to know that the lawyer cared).
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ents, unlikely to live in a role-differentiated manner, also have access
to the same aligned, zealous representation?
Finally, a principal concern in the amoral lawyering justification
of neutral partisanship is that lawyers will infringe on a client‘s autonomy because of their disproportionate share of power in the relationship.168 On the basis of this perceived power-differential, neutral
partisanship limits the power of lawyers and expands relative client
power.169 While this may have been a genuine concern in the 1960s
when the bar itself was filled with wealthy, privileged, predominately
white, and generally elite individuals, as the project of diversifying
and expanding the bar changed the composition of the bar, this reality may have also changed. The amoral lawyer defense of the neutralpartisan model assumes that (1) clients are less sophisticated than
lawyers and (2) that the lawyers are financially independent and
therefore are not subject to the client‘s power of the purse.
Today, neither of these points is clear, particularly in the private
sector. Many clients, particularly corporate entities, have more power
in both society and in the client-lawyer relationship than their lawyers. Many, if not most, lawyers are not independently wealthy and
many are saddled with debt.170 They are not, by and large, practicing
the law solely as a vocation. It is a job and they must make money to
live. Therefore, because clients control the money and can withdraw
their business and go elsewhere, clients, not lawyers, often have the
coercive power in the attorney-client relationship.
D. Defining Neutrality and the Limits of Self:
Diversity and Equality
The final modern justifications for neutral partisanship are that it
protects diversity and equality.171 However, this attempt is premised
on accepting that: (1) neutrality protects those with minority viewpoints from the majority imposing its moral notions and (2) ―neutral‖
rules lack a viewpoint and are impartial. This section questions these
assumptions and looks specifically at how they interact with concepts
of diversity and equality.
168. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 634 (―Because of the large advantages over the client
built into the lawyer‘s professional role, and because of the disadvantages and vulnerability
built into the client‘s role, the professional must subordinate his interest to the client‘s.‖).
169. See id.
170. See Sam Favate, Law Students, How Much Debt Do You Want?, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL LAW BLOG, Mar. 23, 2012, 12:30 PM, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/03/23/lawstudents-how-much-debt-do-you-want/ (noting that in the top ten most expensive law
schools, ―the average student debt was $147,717 in 2011,‖ and overall for all law schools
the average student debt in 2011 was over $100,000).
171. See Pepper, supra note 140.
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1. No One Is Neutral: An Example
The existence of human neutrality in any form is questionable; no
person exists without a viewpoint.172 Rather, what would neutral
qualities of lawyering look like without a background or viewpoint to
fill that term with meaning? How can one define diligence or competence without a full human identity, without a background upon
which to define such terms? Devoid of a set of experiences that shape
her consciousness, a person would be less than human.173
Take Professor Pepper‘s article on neutrality as a case study of
imbedded viewpoint specificity; here, Pepper‘s experiences regarding
social structures weaken his ideological arguments regarding the
moral worth of individual autonomy and diversity. After raising arguments in favor of the moral worth of amoral lawyering on the basis
of protecting unfettered client autonomy, Professor Pepper explains
the concern that ―many clients will come through the door without
much internal moral guidance.‖174 According to Professor Pepper, clients‘ lack of moral guidance is the product of a ―secularized society‖
that lacks ―homogenous moral communities.‖175 First, this assumes
that because a lawyer fails to discern an internal guidance, it is in
fact not there. Second, equating morality with immersion in a homogenous moral community is in tension with a commitment to valuing diversity. This statement seems to indicate that pluralism functions as an intermediary step towards a homogenous ideal: a benevolent assimilation process into a brave new homogenous (moral) world.
And yet, it is the moral worth of pluralism that buttresses Professor
Pepper‘s argument for much of his article. Many ―Americans take
their pluralism as a fact to celebrate rather than a problem to be
overcome‖; however, here the lack of a singular moral vision in a
community is viewed as a lack of moral substance.176
The article goes on to reveal other imbedded assumptions regarding society and its norms and values. In discussing client morality, it
paints a nostalgic picture of the past when clients gained their moral
172. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 11 (1989)
(―[G]ender-neutral terms frequently obscure the fact that so much of the real experience of
‗persons,‘ so long as they live in gender-structured societies, does in fact depends on what
sex they are.‖); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (denying the presence of an ―unencumbered‖ self).
173. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed.
1984) (arguing that the self is constituted by a life story with a purpose or ―telos‖).
174. Pepper, supra note 11, at 627. It is not without a certain irony that one can imagine that certain clients would feel similarly about the ―neutral‖ lawyers that come through
the door seemingly devoid of morality.
175. Id.
176. Spaulding, supra note 11, at 1389 (discussing how in a value-pluralistic society
referencing ―ordinary morality‖ offered little substantive mooring).
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footing from ―[t]he rural town, the ethnic neighborhood, the church
attended for several generations, the local business or trade community.‖177 This is a world far removed from the ―urbanized society‖ of the
Model Code.178 Here the viewpoint provides a key insight: Professor
Pepper‘s description is ideal to some, while morally oppressive to others. Some may think of rural towns as quiet places where children play
safely in the streets, but to others these same neighborhoods and
groups were strongholds of provincialism, places where racially restrictive covenants, restrictive zoning, or community norms prevented
many people from living productive lives. Many small trade groups
(including the nascent ABA) historically excluded minorities and women. However, Professor Pepper‘s experiences with these institutions
may have led him to be less skeptical of these institutions as sources of
morality, despite the fact that other rational thoughtful people may
view them as the opposite based on their factual experiences.
Finally, when Professor Pepper asks, ―would there have been more
social justice, equality, or general welfare if lawyers had altered or
withheld services on the basis of their own (largely middle- or upperclass) values?‖ he reveals not only that he assumes that lawyers are
of a certain economic class but that the class to which they belong
has some sort of unitary overarching set of beliefs.179 The answer to
his question as phrased may be ―no,‖ but this claim is falsifiable.
There is also no reason why the socio-economic class of lawyers need
be grounded in a particular narrow set of class values—unless the
bar is failing to include people from varied backgrounds. The problem
is not that lawyers will screen client values. The problem is that lawyers are a monolithic privileged group legislating over clients with
whom they share little or no experience or values. How would we answer the following question: Would there have been more social justice, equality, or general welfare if lawyers from all walks of life represented clients whose legal ends they believed in?
The point here is not to denigrate Professor Pepper‘s important
scholarship and considerable influence. Rather, it is to point out that
even a careful, well-intentioned, intelligent person who is trying to
protect diversity, equality, and individual autonomy is unable to set
aside the lens through which they interpret the world.

177. Pepper, supra note 11, at 627.
178. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980).
179. Pepper, supra note 11, at 620.
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2. Racism Without Racists180
Codifying neutral partisanship in the 1960s is not only problematic because the possibility of human neutrality is generally suspect. It
is also an issue because neutrality had a particular socially charged
understanding at that time. Neutrality, like color-blindness, was an
attempt to conceptualize means for achieving social equality in a
country of racially and ethnically diverse citizens. This nascent theoretical understanding of how to facilitate equal access to justice and
free exercise of rights and how to strive towards equality shaped the
Model Code (and by extension, the subsequent rules of conduct that
have followed). While the concepts of the Model Code have remained
relatively static in Model Rules of Professional Conduct today, understandings of inequality in a pluralistic society have developed further. This section seeks to bridge that divide.
Most likely, the drafters of the Model Code were familiar with arguments in favor of remedying social inequality through ―colorblindness.‖ The concept of colorblindness was prevalent in discussions contemporary to the drafting of the Model Code as related to civil rights
struggles of the 1950s and 1960s.181 The president of the ABA who
called the Wright Committee, Justice Powell, went onto join the Supreme Court where he authored several important opinions regarding race and colorblindness.182 No doubt there is an appeal to the idea
that the best way to make sure different people are treated fairly is
to treat them all the same. The problem lies in determining how you
will treat them all the same—and who defines that sameness.
The dangers of institutional mandates for neutrality are very similar to those imbedded in colorblindness in that both support, whether consciously or subconsciously, a hierarchy where the dominant
groups‘ status is the ―norm‖ and all other groups are the non-neutral
180. I have borrowed this phrase from Eduardo Bonilla-Silva‘s book of the same name.
EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS (2010) (arguing that colorblindness
creates its own form of racism). But see generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE
SUPREMACY (1981) (arguing that racism should only apply to practices that hinge on white
supremacy, the idea that whites as a race are inherently better and more capable than
other races).
181. See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS,
CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 28-34 (1996) (detailing the development of colorblindness arguments dating back to 1884 and up through the key discrimination legislation in
the 1960s); see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–14 (2012); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012).
182. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1987) (finding no discrimination in
Georgia‘s death penalty system despite the fact that Georgia imposed death sentences on
blacks who murder whites at twenty-two times the rate of blacks who murder blacks); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (finding that racial and ethnic classifications of any sort are inherently suspect and call for strict scrutiny, even when remedial in nature).
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―other.‖183 Norms and assumptions impact how rules are written and
how institutions function.184 This skews the system towards the
preexisting status quo, regardless of intent, and creates a fissure between ―our public commitments and our lived realities.‖185 Under this
understanding, outsider groups are allowed entrance into traditionally exclusive groups, such as the bar, only if they conform their conduct to the dominant groups‘ norms. Successful assimilators gain access to the dominant group‘s power. The price is that in exchange,
these people‘s distinct views, skills, and cultural influences are cast
aside.186 Neutrality accommodates difference only by ignoring and
therefore sublimating it. It does so by creating a neutral baseline
comfortable to the dominant class of lawyers and based on their assumptions of what is neutral lawyer behavior. But assumptions are
defined by this class‘s experience and therefore are, necessarily, nonneutral.
Ian Haney-López lays out the limitations of colorblindness, noting
that while it may have undercut ideas of white supremacy during the
first phase of the civil rights movement, colorblindness was ineffective at dealing with systemic lingering racism.187 So too here, one can
imagine that perhaps at the outset of the Model Code, there may
have been utility to shielding lawyers for the moral pronouncement
of the majority. But whatever efficacy that policy may have had in
relation to overt recognition, it has run its course.188
183. In this way, neutral partisanship falls prey to similar pitfalls to John Rawls‘s
original position. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (asserting as his
original position that the best way to create a just society was to organize it from behind a
―veil of ignorance‖ as if one did not have any specific identity or moral standpoint and also
had no idea where one would be placed within the social order). Presumably this situation
would allow the party involved to be impartial and fair. However, critiques of Rawls have
clarified how in the attempt to create an impartial self, Rawls has actually created an individual who cannot exist as a real person, because a real person is part of incorporated entities, like the family, that have their own imbedded structure. See OKIN, supra note 172,
at 96-99.
184. See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
157 (2006) (―Colorblindness is in this sense not a prescription but an ideology, a set of understandings that delimits how people comprehend, rationalize and act in the world.‖).
185. Id. at 144.
186. See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness”
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 103-05 (2000).
187. See LÓPEZ, supra note 184, at 157-58 (―In the wake of the civil rights movement‘s
limited but significant triumphs, the relationship between colorblindness and racial reform
changed remarkably. Whereas colorblindness in the context of Jim Crow was heavy with
emancipatory promise, in the civil rights era and since, its greatest potency instead lies in
preserving the racial status quo.‖).
188. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 6 (1991) (―[B]efore a private person or a government agent can decide ‗not to consider
race,‘ he must first recognize it. In other words, we could say that one ‗noticed race but did
not consider it.‘ ‖).
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The issue we face now is one of structural inequality.189 Colorblindness still requires that whoever enters the dominant group assimilate or ―pass‖ as white:
We must be careful not to discount the willingness of significant
sectors within the White community to extend a presumption of
full human worth to racial minorities—nor should we be surprised
that this presumption of full humanity often translates into treating ostensibly non-White persons as if they were White.190

Likewise, in the legal profession, compliance with neutral partisanship awards women and minorities full lawyer status for conforming their behavior to the preexisting norms established in lawyering
prior to their entrance into the profession. As such, being treated
―like a lawyer‖ translates into non-male, non-white, non-traditional
lawyers being treated as the preexisting demographic of the bar
(white men), or, alternatively, the way well-meaning white men
might paternalistically treat women and minorities.
3. The Model Code Decoded: Examples of Non-Neutral “Neutrality”
Doctrinally, neutral partisanship is supported by attempting to
set a baseline of conduct that is unpoliticized. However, the very conceptions of what is a lawyer‘s proper role, what are a lawyer‘s mandatory duties, and how daily practice unfolds have rippling repercussions for the bar generally, certain lawyers in particular, disenfranchised clients, and the legal system. These choices are not neutral,
nor can they be. The choices made in the Model Code, and now the
Model Rules, reflect a certain view of agency and the lawyer‘s prioritization of duties to client, law, society, and broader morality. It is a
moral view, and it cannot be neutral. In it, agency is defined in terms
of a certain type of loyalty, a certain type of candor (regarding the law
but not the lawyer‘s self), a certain type of competency, and confidentiality. In it, duties to clients are paramount. The examples provided
below are meant to be illustrative of this point, but not exhaustive.
The 1969 Model Code set priorities for the legal profession by
enumerating skills or duties necessary for lawyering in the disciplinary rules. These enumerated duties included competence, diligence,
loyalty, and candor.191 In keeping with established conventions of

189. See generally Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779
(2012) (discussing how intent and colorblindness combine to fail to remedy lasting structural inequality).
190. LÓPEZ, supra note 184, at 154.
191. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1980).
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code interpretation, anything not on the list is excluded.192 Thus, the
Model Code‘s explicit articulation of relevant skills also creates a list
of irrelevant skills. Lawyers who have strengths that are not neutral
under status quo-defined baseline are at a disadvantage.193
For example, in attempting to reach a neutral baseline, the Model
Code adopted a version of lawyering that minimized and marginalized skills associated with women, particularly skills emphasizing
emotional intelligence or group consciousness.194 Why? The Model
Code was the first time the bar attempted to write rules that defined
a baseline of conduct in a ―neutral‖ way for a pluralistic group. The
Canons, in contrast, did not need to be ―neutral‖ across differences—
the bar was generally homogenous. In the attempt to create a neutral
code, the drafters of the Model Code most likely excised qualities that
they felt were not neutral. However, since they defined a baseline
from their viewpoints, a neutral code was one without ―gendered‖
qualities—meaning those qualities associated with women.
Some of the qualities that could be included on this list are compassion, empathy/sympathy, and relationship building.195 Compassion is not only excluded as a necessary lawyerly trait: one could argue it is expressly barred. For example, DR-103(B) forbids the ad192. In statutory interpretation terms this is known as ―expressio unius est exclusio
alterius,‖ meaning ―the express mention of one thing excludes all others.‖ BLACK‘S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
193. The exclusion of these traits has actually led to a norm that is generally harmful
to the profession, as the public has grown to perceive lawyers as heartless and selfinterested, and lawyers themselves have fallen into higher rates of depression and dissatisfaction. See Jacquelyn Smith, The Happiest and Unhappiest Jobs in America, FORBES
(Mar. 22, 2013, 2:55 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/03/22/the-happiestand-unhappiest-jobs-in-america/ (listing associate attorney as the most unhappy profession
in America).
194. For the sake of demonstration, we will use here the broad brush stroke definition
of gendered qualities articulated by different voice feminism: men are associated with
rules, enumerating duties, and individual ethics, while feminine qualities including sensitivity to others, loyalty, responsibility, self-sacrifice, and peacemaking all reflect interpersonal involvement. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN‘S DEVELOPMENT (1982). While this breakdown is simplistic, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1980),
it provides a broad jumping-off point that continues to be echoed in popular discourse to
this day. See also LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN (2006) (arguing that women‘s
brains are configured to render them more adept to social and group interactions).
195. In relation to civility as well, the Canons make a stronger case than the Model
Code. Specifically, the Canons discuss the need for a ―respectful attitude‖ and expressly
frown on using lawsuits to obtain funds from clients. See Final Report, supra note 18, at
579 (Canons 1, 14). Lawyers are chastised for engaging in ―unseemly wrangling‖ as ―[a]ll
personalities between counsel should be scrupulously avoided.‖ Id. at 580 (Canon 17). In
questioning witnesses, the Canons caution against ―improper speech‖ and ―offensive personalities.‖ Id. at 580 (Canon 18); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7101 (1980) (requiring only generally at (A)(1) that lawyers ―avoid[] offensive tactics, [and]
treat[] with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process‖).
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vancement of funds to clients beyond specific circumstances relating to
supporting the litigation.196 At no point is a lawyer permitted to give
funds to a client outright, regardless of need.197 The Model Code and
the current Model Rules fail to recognize a duty to provide emergency
aid or need. In fact, the Model Code does not include an overall duty of
a lawyer to communicate effectively with her client, although one rule
requires that the client is notified of the receipt of assets,198 and there
are several rules that regulate communications with those with adverse interests as well as contact with witnesses, investigators, and
the press.199 Communication in general is a skill which women are often viewed as excelling in.200 While today a ―duty to inform‖ a client is
included in the Model Rules,201 this initial omission is noteworthy.
Perhaps more telling than what was included in the Model Code
from the Canons is what was removed or downplayed. Specifically,
the Model Code deemphasized community building and relationships
at the bar, emotional consciousness, and civility, qualities easily associated with traditional ―feminine‖ qualities, despite the fact that
these qualities are valued by clients.202 The exclusion of certain skills
that were previously present in the Canons is particularly insightful
given the Code generally greatly expanded, rather than limited, the
Canons.203 The preface of the Model Code notes a main goal behind
drafting new codes was to add ―important areas of conduct that were
either only partially covered or totally omitted from the Canons‖ and
observed that the Canons were ―sound in substance‖ but needed editorial revision.204
As an initial matter, the Canons take a stronger view of the interconnected nature of the legal community and the duties of collegiality. The Canons expect lawyers to have loyalty to one another and an
196. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B), EC 5-8 (1980).
197. See id.
198. See id. at DR 9-102(B)(1) (―A lawyer shall: Promptly notify a client of the receipt of
his funds, securities, or other properties.‖).
199. See id. at DR 7-104, DR 7-107-10.
200. See HELEN FISHER, THE FIRST SEX: THE NATURAL TALENTS OF WOMEN AND HOW
THEY ARE CHANGING THE WORLD 57-83 (1999).
201. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (requiring under the title ―communication‖ in part B that ―[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation‖).
202. Ann Juergens, Valuing Small Firm and Solo Law Practice: Models for Expanding
Service to Middle-Income Clients, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 80, 113 (2012) (reporting results of a study of small firms and solo practitioners who served moderate-income clients,
which found that the principal factors in lawyer success were relationship building, communication, and collaboration with non-lawyers).
203. The Canons were originally only nine pages long, while the Model Code was over
fifty pages long when it was first passed.
204. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980).
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overall sense of civility. For example, Canon II (7) states that even if
a client would like assistance of additional counsel, ―[a] lawyer
should decline association as colleague if it is objectionable to the
original counsel.‖205 The Canons also outline how ―[e]fforts, direct or
indirect, in any way to encroach upon the business of another lawyer
are unworthy of those who should be brethren at the Bar.‖206 However the Code makes no mention of such considerations nor of a duty of
civility even in the broadest terms.
In compiling the necessary skills of lawyers, the Model Code also
omits empathy and sympathy despite the fact that the Canons themselves outline specific instances mandating emotionally conscious
actions. For example, the Canons admonish that an attorney should
refrain from pushing trial forward where opposing counsel ―is under
affliction or bereavement.‖207 The Canons also barred attempts to
―curry favor‖ with jurors through ―fawning, flattery, or pretend solicitude.‖208 In the role of the advocate as articulated in the Model Code,
there is no requirement to communicate or advise, taking into account the fear, anxiety, or general holistic state of one‘s client. This
has ongoing repercussions. The bar‘s reticence to recognize as valid
lawyer skills emotional intelligence and interpersonal aptitude has
intensified over time as rules related to compassion have tightened209
and even time-honored lawyerly traits with emotional resonance,
such as zeal, have fallen into disfavor.210
Notably, the Model Code not only omitted certain qualities from
the discussion of legal ethics—it also created new explicit duties. For
the first time, a free standing duty of competence was articulated by
designating a section of the Model Code under Canon 6 ―A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Competently.‖211 Competence is also referenced in the first Canon of the Model Code, which states that ―[a]
lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of
the legal profession.‖212 In the enforceable and binding disciplinary
rules, the Model Code commanded as follows:
205. Final Report, supra note 18, at 577 (Canon 7).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 581 (Canon 24).
208. Id. at 581.
209. This element of the Code continues to this day in Model Rule 1.8, which subjects
lawyers to discipline even if they provide money to clients for necessary, emergency, or
vital non-legal expenses. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2002).
210. For a more thorough discussion of the removal of zeal as a requirement over time,
see Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165 (2006); Lawrence J. Vilardo & Vincent E. Doyle III, Where Did the Zeal Go?, 38 LITIG. (No. 1) 1, 4 (2011).
211. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1980).
212. Id. at Canon 1.
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A lawyer shall not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or
should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it. (2) Handle a
legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.213

Competence is defined in terms of substantive legal knowledge,
preparation, and organization. It limited the ability of lawyers to
take on cases in opposition to the existing bar, as practice in areas of
law that were new to an attorney required an existing member of the
bar to ―associate[e]‖ with the work. Generally, competence was not
assessed by clients, peers, or by senior attorneys in a mentorship
style environment. Instead, the competence revolution manifested in
the first multistate bar exams in 1972, the requirement of attendance
at ABA accredited schools in most jurisdictions, compulsory bar
membership with ongoing fees, and ongoing legal education requirements. Competence did not include emotional intelligence, negotiation
skills, substantive knowledge of the community being served, communication skills, or demonstrations of substantive writing skills.
The Wright Committee made clear that competence was added to
the Model Code as a measure for screening lawyers, arguing that
―standards must be established to exclude people from admission to
the bar who could not, or are not likely to, serve clients capably and
well‖214 The inclusion of a competence duty as defined and implemented erected a barrier to entry to the legal profession and a means
to remove bar licensing. In particular, competence was highlighted as
being of central importance to all parties, ―only if all persons have
access to the law, which requires that they have access to lawyers of
integrity and competence,‖ will government be that ―of laws, not of
men.‖215 This distinction is particularly meaningful given the historic
context of the Code‘s drafting, when the issue of adherence to law
had very real consequences in terms of support or lack of support for
acts of civil disobedience. Committee Chairman Wright also articulated a more self-serving rationale: that misconduct by individuals
would reflect badly on all lawyers and the judicial system.216

213. Id. at DR 6-101(A)(1-3).
214. Wright, supra note 10, at 9.
215. Id. at 7.
216. See id. at 8 (―Lawyers are the face of our legal system that laymen most often see;
the impressions that laymen have of our legal system are often in large measure by their
impressions of lawyers.‖).
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4. Day to Day Practice: Limited Lawyer’s Roles, Limited Lawyers
and Their Clients
Divesting lawyers of broader social and moral responsibility beyond
client service limits the lawyer‘s role in playing a unique and influential part in civil society. This limited role of lawyers may disproportionally impact socially disenfranchised individuals who become lawyers. The divestment of broader societal power from the attorney‘s role
generally has a particularly acute impact for attorneys who do not
have other means to access influence. These lawyers must use their
education and professional status to impact causes they favor, as opposed to lawyers who are wealthy, well connected, or have other avenues for gaining influence. The limitation of the lawyer‘s role may also
mean that some of the most educated and privileged members of a minority group (those who have law degrees) may be substantially limited in their ability to act politically through their work.
The neutral-partisan dominant ethos may discourage lawyers who
are politically or morally motivated to become lawyers from joining
the bar, since the neutral-partisan model of lawyering does not expect them to act upon their convictions. Likewise, it may also increase in the relative strength of the amoral lawyering contingent of
the bar skews the legal profession away from even discretionary exercises of lawyer moral autonomy.217 To a certain extent, the bar is
self-selected: people who find the neutral-partisan ideal appealing
are attracted to the practice of law. Likewise, the inverse is also true;
those attracted to the practice of law to engage with broader issues of
justice and morality are likely to be repelled. When these people consider or attend law school the ―dominant view‖ sends the message
that such views of a lawyer‘s role are fringe and bordering on unprofessional and that neutral-partisan client service is the central and
perhaps only legitimate goal of lawyering.
The neutral-partisan limited role of lawyers also quiets the voices
of lawyers who serve disenfranchised clients. The dominant ethos left
217. In the discretionary spirit of the work of Bill Simon, the current Model Rules do
allow for certain discretionary exercises of morality but do not compel lawyers to act under
these circumstances. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2013) (providing for
disclosures pursuant to all exceptions to attorney duty of confidentiality, including those
related to serious harms to third parties and those that are discretionary); id. at R. 1.16(b)
(providing that lawyers may, under the right circumstances, withdraw from the representation where they have serious moral objections); id. at R. 2.1 (providing that lawyers may
advise client on extra-legal concerns including ―moral economic, social and political factors‖
relevant to a client‘s case); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1083 (1988). However, the discretionary exercise of lawyer morality does not eliminate imbedded issues regarding ambiguity and pervasive norms of practice as well as the
toll that the neutral-partisan baseline takes on both lawyers and the public perception of
lawyers.
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in place under a standard conception regime is one that limits lawyer
autonomy to a very narrow bandwidth—essentially rendering a lawyer‘s legitimate exercise of power in society as coterminous with that
of clients. Therefore, lawyers who have powerful and sophisticated
clients will also have broad power in society and leeway to pursue
long-term legal goals and strategies. As repeat players, clients who
are already sophisticated enough to comprehend and utilize the power of the law for societal influence can seek incremental structural
change that is to their benefit. However, these clients do not need
neutral partisanship to protect their autonomy; they are informed
and have ample means to use market forces to curtail and shape
lawyer behavior. On the other hand, lawyers with disenfranchised
clients are comparatively limited. Clients from disenfranchised
groups may not have the material means to set aside immediate relief in favor of developing long-term interests. Therefore, a system
which does not set lawyer moral integration as a baseline leaves
broad civic and moral issues almost exclusively to those who already
have considerable social influence by virtue of their legal sophistication and wealth.
5. Discussion, Dissent, and Homogeneity: The Value of Pluralism
Somewhat ironically, amoral lawyering seeks to facilitate individual rights, equality, and diversity in American society by attempting
to eradicate a plurality of views at the bar, leaving a neutral conduit
for clients‘ pluralistic views/agendas. There is a certain democratization element here, if one believes, as was the case in the mid-sixties,
that clients were the common people and lawyers represented the
elite. However, the bar is larger and much more diversified today. In
many lawyer-client relationships the client is more ―elite‖ than the
lawyer. In this context, a system in a democratic society that seeks to
impose a false sense of homogeneity for the purpose of avoiding ideological conflict is fundamentally misguided. Ideological conflict and
dialogue across difference is necessary and important to a functioning democracy. It is not to be avoided or quashed, particularly in a
forum, such as law practice, with a strong pedagogical purpose and
highly visible role in society.
Neutral partisanship buys at a heavy price the peaceable coexistence of lawyers and clients with whom they have a moral disconnect.
To the extent that pluralism has value in American society, it must
actually exist in the public space and be predicated on open difference, not concealment. Disagreement, discomfort, and discourse are
necessary and beneficial to the growth of American democracy and to
the development of just laws. Because of this, attempting to eradicate
difference through ―neutrality‖ may also be immoral. If the bar truly
seeks to protect diversity and equality (moral goals according to the
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modern apostles of neutral partisans), then legal ethical guidance
cannot seek an ideal where lawyers behave as though they were a
homogenous group when they are not, and should not be. Rather,
peaceful coexistence despite difference is wrong if it is predicated on
fabricating and imposing homogeneity.
Morally valid pluralism requires disagreement, not avoidance.
Disagreement, as in ―factions,‖ is useful and necessary in a democracy to allow all parties a fair hearing, impede rash and unjust action,
and make incremental steps towards the development of morally
worthy law.218 This is as true in a civil action as in the voting process.
The process of having civil discussions encourages competition of ideas and forces established thought to continually be reexamined, tested, and improved. Homogeneity allows ideas and power to stagnate
and threatens the stability and legitimacy of a democracy.219 However, difference must be open, apparent, and discussed for its value to
be realized.
Lawyers act as civic teachers to their clients, explaining how the
American system of justice is supposed to work, what civic obligations are, and how to engage in civil discourse across differences.220
Clients can educate lawyers about how law is actually working on the
ground and present their own moral views. Clients and lawyers, specifically, and society at large, benefit from lawyers and clients engaging in discussions of morality and the law.221 The current system abbreviates both the client‘s moral input and the lawyer‘s.222 By requiring moral dialogue before selecting and seeking an outcome, the profession sends the reassuring message to clients and attorneys that
morality does have a place in the consideration of law, supporting the
legitimacy of legal institutions. Lawyers can feel pride in working
towards a cause they believe in, and for an institution that values
forthright conversation. The attorney client relationship would flour218. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (stating that factions are a necessary means of protecting minority interests: ―Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common
interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.‖).
219. Arguments in favor of the valor of difference play out more often in the literature
related to market economies, where homogeneity is seen as stifling agency, innovation, and
creativity.
220. See generally Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at
Home”: The Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207,
1235-37 (2009) (arguing that, at a minimum, lawyers have a duty to discuss ideals of civic
duty and virtue with clients).
221. See LUBAN, supra note 128, at 38 (arguing that the discovery of moral differences
need not end the attorney-client relationship and proposing a different ideal of a ―law practice in which the lawyer who disagrees with the morality or justice of a client‘s ends does
not simply terminate the relationship, but tries to influence the client for the better‖).
222. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 630.
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ish as lawyers have conversations with their clients that are not
steeped in knowledge inequalities; both client and lawyer have equal
claim to moral expertise (which may well be none).
Because lawyers are in a unique position to understand the complexity of the law, it is vitally important for our society to have lawyers interact and examine the law applying their ordinary moral
compass.223 The only time this becomes a problem is if we assume, as
Stephen Pepper does, that lawyers share a monolithic and elitist
sense of values. Thus, the problem in this model of lawyering is not
the application of ordinary values to legal representation or laws, but
the application of a limited subgroup‘s ordinary values to these enterprises. In this way, moral legitimacy is intimately intertwined
with diversifying the legal profession. However, for the reasons discussed earlier, the system as it stands fails to encourage the inclusion of divergent moral dialogue.
A general culture of dissent and discussion among the bar and
their clients enfranchises citizenry. It combats unnecessary lawyer
paternalism and legitimates government institutions. The sense that
different voices will be heard encourages a culture of debate, participation, and investment in the project of governance. Compelling role
integration, rather than differentiation for lawyers, adds actual
transparency to the social structure of society, the attorney-client relationship, and the legal profession as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article took on three key questions to understanding modern
legal ethics and the current law regulating lawyers: (1) When did
lawyers stop discussing professional conduct in the workplace in
moral terms? (2) Why was that choice made? (3) What are the failings and current impacts of that choice? As to the first point, this Article argues that the advent of the 1969 Model Code marked a break
in the marriage between the ideas of professional conduct and role
integration. In explaining this shift, the Article draws on historical
sources and textual analysis to make the argument that the choice to
limit moral agency was one grounded in a pragmatic need to facilitate a certain view of pluralism. Finally, the remainder of the Article
outlines how the advantages of neutral partisanship in terms of pluralism (as defined by its advocates) fail in many respects.
The Model Code and subsequent professional norms are vestiges
of a charged historical moment, a moment in which the language of
223. Particularly now when law is increasingly voluminous and specialized, lawyers
may be the only parties who know of the complex apparatus of law in a given area and its
ramifications.
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difference was nascent and theoretical understanding of diversity,
equality, and individual rights was underdeveloped. In that context,
even well intentioned parties could perceive a commitment to divorcing ethics from professional conduct and justifying neutral partisanship as moral, based on a flawed conception of how to facilitate equality and plurality.
Yet lawyers, as a profession, continue to plow forward without
taking into account that historic moment, the tensions inherent in
that moment, and the missteps taken in accordance with those early
misconceptions of facilitating change, equality, and pluralism at the
bar. In creating a code that incorporates latent bias, delegitimizes the
discussion of broad ethical themes, and undermines lawyer individualism by adopting a homogenizing neutral-partisan ideal, the Model
Code fundamentally undermined meaningful long-term pluralism,
legal ethics, and the profession as a whole.
Today, the legal profession and modern legal ethics continue to
struggle with the historic legacies built deep into the doctrinal and
normative framework of the Model Code. Setting aside moral discourse among lawyers in service of demographic pluralism and adopting neutral partisanship was a poor trade, grounded in fundamental
theoretical misconceptions of what neutrality and pluralism require.
Adopting neutral partisanship as the ―standard conception‖ of lawyering prevented, rather than enabled, the meaningful inclusion of
the values of new entrants to the bar and solidified an ideal of lawyers that is dehumanizing. Neutral partisanship limits all lawyers‘
ability to legitimately articulate their moral judgment, differing
viewpoints, and unique experiences in the workplace.
The story here is not one of calculated malevolence. The architects
of the Model Code were reasonable people drafting what appeared at
the time to be a sensible plan to respond to a changing professional
landscape. But these drafters were limited by the scope of their personal experiences and historical context. Their limitations need not
be ours.

